CHAPTER 21

Terrorism and globalization

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The technologies and processes linked with globalization have enabled terrorism to grow from a regional phenomenon into a global one. Precisely how globalization has influenced terrorism, however, is difficult to determine. The difficulty lies in the complex nature and local variations of terrorism as a form of irregular warfare, almost as much as it does with different interpretations of what comprises globalization. The current manifestation of terrorist violence has been explained in cultural, economic, and religious terms linked to globalization. Comprehensive explanations of terrorism using such prisms, however, are open to interpretation and debate. What is incontrovertible is that the technologies associated with globalization have enabled terrorist groups to conduct operations that are deadlier, more distributed, and more difficult to combat than those of their predecessors. Technological advantage, however, cuts both ways. The same systems and processes that terrorists can exploit can be harnessed to defeat terrorism by those governments with the will and resources to combat it.

Introduction

The relationship between terrorism and globalization is difficult to describe. Both are complicated, interdisciplinary phenomena that defy simple characterization. That relationship can be examined in cultural, economic, and religious terms. Technology has enabled many of the processes of globalization and terrorists can exploit its benefits. In particular, technologies have improved terrorists' abilities to conduct extremely lethal attacks and grow and sustain a global network of associates and sympathizers. But technologies have a limited ability to change the character of the terrorist message or the nature of the struggle. Terrorism is a weapon of the weak conducted by a minority of individuals who promote an extremist ideology. In order to effect change, terrorist groups must either make their message more appealing, to generate widespread support for their cause, and/or weaken their adversaries to the point of exhaustion or collapse. The global community, in response, must utilize the resources at their disposal collaboratively to diminish support for terrorism and demonstrate the illegitimacy of terrorist messages and causes.

Definitions

Terrorism and globalization share at least one thing in common—both are complex phenomena open to subjective interpretation. Definitions of terrorism vary widely but all start from a common point of departure. Terrorism is characterized, first and foremost, by the use of violence. Such violence includes hostage taking, hijacking, bombing, and other indiscriminate attacks, usually targeting civilians. However, the purpose towards which violence is used, and the motivation behind it, is where most of the disagreements related to terrorism begin. Traditionally, terrorism has been separated from criminal acts on the basis of its political legitimacy. According to those sympathetic to terrorist causes, the violence undertaken is the only way to draw attention to the plight and grievances of a specific group, as opposed to an individual. With little recourse to change other than through violence, some view terrorism as an acceptable method of righting an injustice while others see it as an egregious act. Historically, such causes have included ideological, ethnic, and religious exclusion or persecution.

One of the difficulties in defining terrorism is that groups often espouse multiple grievances. For example, the Chechens are seeking independence from the Russian Federation but the group is also motivated by religious imperatives. Those targeted by terrorists are less inclined to see any justification, much less legitimacy, behind attacks that kill and maim civilians. As a result, the term 'terrorist' has a pejorative value ascribed to it that further complicates understanding of the subject.

Reaching consensus on what constitutes terrorism

Box 21.1 Types of terrorist groups

Audrey Kurth Cronin has outlined different types of terrorist groups and their historical importance in the following way:

> 'There are four types of terrorist organizations currently operating around the world, categorized mainly by their source of motivation: left-wing terrorists, right-wing terrorists, ethnonationalist/separatist terrorists, and religious or "sacred" terrorists. All four types have enjoyed periods of relative prominence in the modern era, with left-wing terrorism intertwined with the Communist movement, right-wing terrorism drawing its inspiration from fascism, and the bulk of ethnonationalist/separatist terrorism accompanying the wave of decolonization especially in the immediate post-World War II years. Currently, "sacred" terrorism is becoming more significant. Although groups in all categories continue to exist today, left-wing and right-wing terrorist groups were more numerous in earlier decades. Of course, these categories are not perfect, as many groups have a mix of motivating ideologies—some ethnonationalist groups, for example, have religious characteristics or agendas—but usually one ideology or motivation dominates.'
>
> (Kurth Cronin 2002/03: 39)

is difficult and one of the foremost reasons for disagreement relates to different interpretations of the legitimacy of terrorist means and methods. Some view forms of political violence such as terrorism as legitimate only if they meet the criteria associated with the 'just war' tradition established by Saint Thomas Aquinas. These criteria, which apply to all applications of force, have been expanded to include a just cause, proportional use of violence, and the use of force as a last resort.

Realists suggest that the political violence used by terrorist groups is illegitimate on the basis that states alone have a '**monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force**'.

Yet even as regards the use of violence by states, there is disagreement on what constitutes legitimate application of armed force. For example, Libya sponsored terrorist groups as a method of responding to the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. Those states, in turn, condemned Libyan sponsorship as against international norms, and they responded with sanctions, international court cases, and occasional uses of force. Much of the disagreement relating to the legitimacy of coalition actions against Iraq in 2003, led by the United States, relates to interpretations over whether or not the conditions for 'just war' were met prior to commencement of military operations. Some suggest that the conditions were not met, and that actions by the coalition should be considered as an 'act of terrorism' conducted by states. Leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom dismiss the charge on the basis that a greater evil was averted against a regime that had demonstrated its willingness to break international norms against neighbouring states, as well as religious and ethnic minorities domestically.

Critical theorists, in particular, reject such arguments by Western state leaders as subjective rhetoric. By classifying any political violence, including acts of terrorism, as illegitimate in international forums they control, Western states preserve the monopoly on the legitimacy of violence in the international system. Using relativist arguments, critical theorists suggest that Western states cannot claim moral superiority, and its associated legitimacy, on the basis of their willingness to contravene international norms as its suits them. If anything, the historical track record of Western states as colonial and/or imperial powers only legitimizes the acts of the disenfranchised who have no other option to combat their continued oppression and poverty.

As with other forms of irregular warfare, including insurgencies and revolution, terrorism has as its goal political change for the purposes of obtaining power in order to right the perceived wrong. Terrorism, however, is the weakest form of irregular warfare with which to alter the political landscape that lacks the broader support of the population that characterizes insurgencies and revolutions. Terrorist groups often lack broader support for their objectives because their goals for change are absolute and based on radical ideas that do not have widespread appeal. In order to influence change, terrorists must provoke

Box 21.2 Legitimacy

Martha Crenshaw provides an analytic, albeit subjective approach to determine the legitimacy of terrorist acts of violence:

> 'The value of the normative approach (to terrorism) is that it confronts squarely a critical problem in the analysis of terrorism, and indeed any form of political violence: the issue of legitimacy. Terrorists of the left deny the legitimacy of the state and claim that the use of violence against it is morally justified. Terrorists of the right deny the legitimacy of the opposition and hold that the violence in the service of order is sanctioned by the values of the status quo ... the need for scholarly objectivity and abstraction does not excuse use from the obligation to judge the morality of the use of force, whether by the state or against.'

She adds that morality can be judged in two ways:

> 'morality of the ends and the morality of the means. First, are the goals of the terrorists democratic or non-democratic? That is, is their aim to create or perpetuate a regime of privilege and inequality, to deny liberty to other people, or to further the ends of justice, freedom, and equality ... Terrorism must not, as the terrorists can foresee, result in *worse* injustice than the condition the terrorists oppose ... The morality of the means of terrorism is also open to judgment. The targets of terrorism are morally significant; witness the difference between material objects and human casualties.'

(Crenshaw 1983: 2–4)

drastic responses that act as a catalyst for change or weaken their opponent's moral resolve. The multiple bombings in Madrid in 2004, for example, influenced the outcome of elections in Spain in a dramatic fashion. Many terrorist leaders hope that their actions will lead to disproportionate reactions by a state that in turn disaffects public or international opinion and increases support for their cause. International reaction to Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, prompted by attacks by the **Palestinian Liberation Organization** and **Abu Nidal**, is an example. Terrorism, however, is a prolonged undertaking in which states and the terrorist groups struggle for legitimacy that can lead to dilemmas associated with the amount and nature of the force applied. Attacks by terrorists that are so horrific run the risk of distancing sympathy and support for their cause. Some groups, such as Hezballah in Lebanon, have opted to wear down the resolve and force the withdrawal of their adversary, in this case Israel, as occurred in May 2000. Given the factors discussed above, the working definition of terrorism for this chapter is 'the use of violence by sub-state groups to inspire fear, by attacking civilians and/or symbolic targets, for purposes such as drawing widespread attention to a grievance, provoking a severe response, or wearing down their opponent's moral resolve, to effect political change'.

As with definitions of terrorism, there is general agreement on at least one aspect of globalization. Technologies allow the transfer of goods, services, and information almost anywhere quickly and efficiently. In the case of information, the transfer can be secure and is nearly simultaneous. There is little doubt that the technologies associated with globalization have been leveraged by terrorists. The extent of social, cultural, and political change brought on by globalization, including increasing interconnectedness and homogeneity in the international system, remain the subject of much disagreement and debate, as other chapters in this volume have outlined. These disagreements influence discussions of how globalization has affected terrorism since the latter became a transnational phenomenon in the 1960s. In order to understand the changes perceived in terrorism globally, it is useful to review the evolution of terrorism from a transnational to a global phenomenon.

Key points

- Agreement on what constitutes terrorism continues to be difficult given the range of potential acts involving violence.
- Terrorism, or acts of violence by sub-state groups, has been separated from criminal acts on the basis of the purpose for which violence is applied, namely political change.
- Terrorist groups succeed when their motivations or grievances are perceived to be legitimate by a wider audience. Disproportionate or heavy-handed responses by states to acts of terrorism serve to legitimize terrorist groups.
- The definition of globalization, as with terrorism, is open to subjective interpretation but the technologies associated with globalization have improved terrorist capabilities.

Terrorism: from transnational to global phenomenon (1968–2001)

Although incidents of terrorism existed prior to 1968, three factors led to the birth of transnational terrorism: the expansion of air travel; the wider availability of televised news coverage; and broad common political and ideological interests. These changes allowed terrorism to grow from a local and regional phenomenon into an international threat. Air travel gave terrorists unprecedented mobility. Prior to the implementation of passport controls, terrorists could travel relatively freely between countries and regions. For example, terrorists of the Japanese Red Army could train in one country and conduct operations half a world away, as they did in the Lod Airport suicide attack in Israel in 1972. Air travel

was also appealing to terrorists for another reason. Airport security measures were almost non-existent when terrorists began hijacking airlines. These '**skyjackings**', as they were eventually labelled, suited terrorist purposes well. Hijacked aircraft offered a degree of protection and security for the terrorists involved, and states initially acquiesced to terrorist demands, which encouraged further incidents. The high success rate of hijacking as a technique spurred other terrorist groups, as well as criminals and political refugees, to follow suit. As a result, incidents of hijacking skyrocketed from five in 1966 to 94 in 1969. Shared political ideologies stimulated cooperation and limited exchanges between groups as diverse as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque separatist Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). Besides sharing techniques and technical experience, groups demanded the release of imprisoned 'fellow revolutionaries' in different countries, giving the impression of a coordinated terrorist network.

Televised news coverage also played a role in expanding the audience who could witness the '**theatre of terrorism**' in their own homes. Individuals who had never heard of 'the plight of the Palestinians' became notionally aware of the issue after incidents such as the triple-hijacking and blowing up of airliners by the **Popular** Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in September 1970, or live coverage of the hostage taking conducted by Black September during the 1972 Munich Olympics. Although media coverage was termed '**the oxygen that sustains terrorism**', terrorist groups discovered that reporters and audiences lost interest in repeat performances of the same incidents. In order to sustain viewer interest and compete for coverage, terrorist groups undertook increasingly spectacular attacks, such as the seizure of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) delegates by 'Carlos the Jackal' in Austria in December 1975. Terrorism experts speculated that terrorist leaders understood that a horrific, mass casualty attack would alienate support for the group and delegitimize their cause. This helps explain, in part, why few terrorist groups attempted to acquire or use weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, to conduct the most shocking attack imaginable.

The Iranian 'Islamic Revolution' of 1979 was a watershed event in transnational terrorism. Although Israeli interests remained primary targets for attack, due in large part to continued sympathy for the Palestinian cause, the emphasis of a number of transnational groups shifted to attacks on symbols of the United States. In the '**decade of terrorism**' between 1980 and 1990, major attacks against US interests and citizens by groups such as Islamic Jihad Organization included the bombings of the embassy (April 1983) and Marine Corps barracks (October 1983) in Lebanon. Although the majority of attacks consisted of car bombings, assassinations, or kidnappings by groups such as the German Red Army Faction and the Italian Red Brigades, three disturbing trends emerged: attacks were less frequent but more deadly and indiscriminate; some terrorist groups, such as the IRA, were becoming more technologically proficient; and terrorists appeared more willing to sacrifice their own lives in order to kill others.

With the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, many transnational leftist groups found that their sources of sponsorship and support had disappeared. In addition, the law-enforcement and paramilitary measures of states became increasingly effective, especially in Western Europe. For other organizations, transnational attacks were counterproductive. The Palestine Liberation Organization abandoned transnational attacks and focused instead on a conventional uprising, punctuated by terrorist attacks, within Israel to provoke a response. Other groups including ETA and the IRA sought to negotiate a political compromise although they still conducted occasional domestic attacks as a bargaining ploy. Although leftist transnational terrorism was decreasing in scale and intensity, another type of terrorism with global connections and reach was evolving: Al Qaeda, or 'The Base'.

Key points

- Many of the technologies and processes associated with globalization have enabled terrorism to have an impact internationally since 1968.
- The majority of transnational terrorist attacks from 1979 onwards targeted American citizens and symbols.
- The collapse of the Soviet Union denied leftist groups their major source of direct or indirect sponsorship, allowing the rise of religious terrorist groups.

Terrorism: the impact of globalization

Al Qaeda is a terrorist group, a sub-state financial provider, and an ideological rallying point for groups striving towards a broad, common goal. Indeed, some analysts portray the organization as the 'nexus' of global terrorism, with connections to almost all other terrorist groups.

The message of Al Qaeda's founder, Osama bin Laden, combines a number of disparate elements. These elements include: the restoration of the former greatness of Islam through selective historical interpretation; the defence of oppressed Muslims and the defeat of the theological enemies of Islam; the requirement for absolute religious piety and devotion; global economic conspiracy theory that links to international poverty and suffering; and a rejection of secular materialism. His message has



Fig. 21.1 The global terrorism nexus

Source: National War College Student Task Force on Combating Terrorism (2002: 12).

Fig. 21.2 Al Qaeda's global activities from 1993 onward

proven appealing to individuals and groups in areas as diverse as Egypt (Egyptian Islamic Jihad), Indonesia (Jemaah Islamiyah), and Uzbekistan (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan). Bin Laden's message has enough different elements, woven into an overarching theory that links local suffering and poverty to a vast international Zionist and Christian network, that it taps into suspicions and anger in underdeveloped sections of the world where conspiracy theories form part of the indigenous culture. Efforts to describe the growth of terrorism into a global phenomenon (and its popularity), including its linkages to globalization, have focused on three areas: culture, economics, and religion.

Cultural explanations

'Culture' is one way to explain how armed struggle is used to preserve traditions and values against a wave of Western products and influence as the underdeveloped world perceives it (see Ch.24). Once sought after as an entry method to economic prosperity, Western secular, materialist cultural values are increasingly rejected by those seeking to regain or preserve their own unique cultural identity. The social changes associated with globalization and the spread of free market capitalism can seem to overwhelm the ethnic identity or religious values of smaller groups who believe that they are the losers in the new international system. In an attempt to preserve their threatened identity and values, groups actively distinguish themselves from 'others' who have different norms. At the local level, this may translate into conflicts divided along religious or ethnic lines in a struggle to safeguard their uniqueness.

On a global level, however, the number of civilizations is limited. They include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, and Latin American (Huntington 1993: 25). Geography and relative cultural stability limit the potential friction between some of the civilizations. Where individuals within a culture perceive their civilization to be weakened, insecure, or stagnant, and interaction is high between weak and strong civilizations, conflict may be inevitable. Huntington suggests that a major '**fault-line**' exists between the liberal Western civilization and an Islamic one 'humiliated and resentful of the West's military presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and . . . [unable] to shape their own destiny' (ibid.: 32).

Critics of Huntington suggest that he ascribes a degree of homogeneity within the Islamic world that simply does not exist. Theologically and socially, the Islamic 'civilization' contains a number of deep fault-lines that impede the cooperation required to challenge the West. Although attractive to some, Osama bin Laden's ideology is uncompromising towards non-believers, including fellow Muslims. Non-believers, who fall into the categories of infidels (those of different religion) and apostates (those who do not share his interpretation of the Koran), are all equal in Bin Laden's eyes. As a result, although Al Qaeda dismisses the collateral death of scores of Arabs and Muslims on 11 September and after the bombing of an apartment block in Saudi Arabia in November 2003 as 'mistakes', such actions increasingly call into question the morality of the means, and therefore the legitimacy of the organization as the champion of Muslim values among the wider and moderate Islamic community.

Economic explanations

Not everyone agrees that the defence of culture or identity is the primary motivation for globalized terrorist violence. Others see economic aspects as the fundamental motivating factor in the use of violence to effect political change. Although globalization provides access to a world market for goods and services, and has stimulated the growth of the economies of Asia, the processes and technologies favour the West and have created a new form of '**economic imperialism**'. In this system, the United States and the post-industrial states of Western Europe that are the global economic '**core**', through their domination of international economic institutions such as the World Bank, set exchange rates and determine fiscal policies that are by and large unfavourable to the underdeveloped countries that comprise the '**periphery**' or '**gap**'.

Wealth is also linked to personal security and violence. With little possible opportunity to obtain

wealth in an increasingly competitive globalized system, especially in states where considerable social inequalities exist, many individuals will leave to pursue opportunities elsewhere. The result will be emigration and/or the rapid growth of burgeoning urban centres that act as regional hubs for the flow of global resources. Movement, however, is no guarantee that individual aspirations will be realized. In that case, individuals may turn to violence for criminal reasons (i.e., personal gain) or political reasons (i.e., to change the existing political system, through insurgency or terrorism). Paradoxically, rising standards of living and greater access to educational opportunities associated with globalization may lead to increased expectations that if unrealized could lead to the adoption of extreme political views and action against 'the system' that has thwarted more conventional ambitions. As justification for the necessity and use of political violence, to right the economic wrongs, the works of authors such as Franz Fanon take on new significance to explain the globalization of terrorism (Onwudiwe 2001: 52–6). For example, Fanon suggested the end of colonialism is not the end of the struggle between the West and the oppressed. It would be replaced by another form of struggle until the economic and power imbalances between the two were equalled (Fanon 1990: 74). Terrorist violence, therefore, is motivated by the inequalities of the global economy. The two attacks against the World Trade Center, in 1993 and 2001, were not reactions against the United States per se, but rather against the icon of global capitalism instead.

The explanation that recent terrorist violence is a reaction to economic globalization contains a number of contradictions related to the wealth of some of the members of terrorist groups and regional patterns of terrorist recruiting. Many former leaders and members of transnational terrorist groups, including the German Red Army Faction and the Italian Red Brigades, came from respectable families. A number of leaders within Al Qaeda, or groups affiliated with the organization, attended graduate schools around the globe in fields as diverse as engineering and theology and were neither poor nor downtrodden. The link between terrorism and poverty also varies considerably between regions. Although terrorist groups have conducted operations in Africa, including bombings and attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and 2002, foreign *jihadists* were responsible. In other words, despite conditions that favuor the outbreak of terrorist violence in Africa against economic imperialism and global capitalism, the continent has been the location of operations but not necessarily a breeding ground for terrorism.

Religion and 'new' terrorism

In the decade prior to 11 September, a number of scholars and experts perceived the fundamental changes taking place in the character of terrorism. The use of violence for political purposes, to change state ideology or the representation of ethnic minority groups, had failed in its purpose and a new trend was emerging. '**Post-modern terrorism**', also known as 'New' terrorism, was conducted for different reasons altogether. Motivated by promises of rewards in the afterlife, some terrorists are driven by religious reasons to kill as many of the non-believers and unfaithful as possible (Laqueur 1996: 32–3). Although suicide tactics had been observed in Lebanon as early as 1983, with the bombings of the US embassy and Marine Corps barracks, '**militant Islam**' had previously been viewed as a state-sponsored, regional phenomenon conducted by sub-state actors (Wright 1986: 19–21).

New terrorism, which some authors use to explain the underlying rationale of the global *jihad*, is seen as a reaction to the perceived oppression of Muslims worldwide and the spiritual bankruptcy of the West. As globalization spreads and societies become increasingly interconnected, Muslims have a choice: reject their beliefs to integrate with the system, or preserve their spiritual purity and fight against it. Those who believe in the global *jihad* view the rulers of 'Islamic' countries such as Egypt and Pakistan as apostates who have compromised their values in the pursuit and maintenance of secular, state-based power. Rather than submit to the system or seek to change it from within, the only response to oppression for those who espouse a radical view of Islam is *jihad*. Although *jihad* is accepted within most Islamic sects as the internal spiritual struggle for purity of the soul, other groups influenced by the writings of radicals such as Sayyid Qutb view the concept in its

Box 21.3 Establishing the Islamic state

'These young men [returning to Allah] realized that an Islamic Government would never be established except by the bomb and rifle. Islam does not coincide or make truce with unbelief, but rather confronts it.

'The confrontation that Islam calls for with these godless and apostate regimes, does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals, nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun . . .

'I present this humble effort to these young Muslim men who are pure, believing, and fighting for the cause of Allah. It is my contribution toward paving the road that leads to majestic Allah and establishes a caliphate according to the prophecy.'

(*Declaration of Jihad Against the Country's Tyrants: Military Series* (n.d.), Government Exhibit 1677-T; UK translation, pp.BM-8–BM-9)

more radicalized, historical usage as a call to arms to defend oppressed Muslims worldwide.

Religious, or 'sacred' terrorism is considered dissimilar from secular terrorism in a number of ways. In particular, the difference in value structures between secular and religious terrorists makes the responses to the latter difficult. As mentioned above, religious terrorists will not just sacrifice themselves but have little compunction about killing large numbers of civilians. Differences in value structures make the **deterrence** of religious terrorism difficult if not impossible, as secular states cannot threaten materially, and therefore credibly, that which terrorists value spiritually. If martyrdom is the ultimate purpose to achieve spiritual purity, how can force be used to threaten it? Finally, secular terrorism has had as its goal the pursuit of power in order to correct flaws within society but retain the overarching system. Religious terrorists, in contrast, do not seek to modify but rather to replace the normative structure of society (Kurth Cronin 2002/03: 41).

The use of religion, as a reaction to and an explanation for the phenomenon of global terrorism, contains some of the same incongruities as those focused on cultural and economic aspects. For Western observers, religious reasons appear to explain why individual terrorists are motivated to take their own lives and kill others. More personal reasons, such as promises of financial rewards for family members, gaining esteem or honour within a community, or merely demonstrating their worthiness, receive little consideration. Yet there is a substantial difference between religious motivation as the single driving factor for individuals to commit acts of terrorism and the ultimate purposes for which violence is being used. If religious violence is an end in and of itself, individuals such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri should have already martyred themselves in the struggle against the infidel to protect Muslim communities. Translated materials and statements suggest that religious fervour is being applied to the achievement of a political purpose: establishing a caliphate or Islamic state.

Key points

- Explanations for terrorist violence based exclusively on the cultural, economic, and religious aspects of globalization provide insights into the underlying motivations and causes for terrorism but lack a holistic understanding of the problem.
- The current wave of terrorist violence uses religious justifications to legitimize the killing of non-combatants.
- Religion may be a powerful motivating element for terrorists, but the ultimate purpose for which violence is applied is the seizing and remoulding of the controls of a state.

Globalization, technology, and terrorism

There is little debate that terrorism has become much more pervasive worldwide due to the processes and technologies of globalization. The technological advances associated with globalization have improved the capabilities of terrorist groups to plan and conduct operations with far more devastation and coordination than their predecessors could have imagined. In particular, technologies have improved the capability of groups and cells in the following areas: proselytizing, coordination, security, mobility, and lethality.

Proselytizing

Terrorist movements and insurgencies have traditionally sought sympathy and support within national boundaries or in neighbouring countries as a means to sustain their efforts. The sustainment of terrorist causes has traditionally been more difficult to achieve as terrorist messages, goals, and grievances have tended to be more extreme and less appealing than those of insurgents. For example, land reform and government corruption have motivated individuals to attempt to change the political system by supporting or joining insurgencies, whereas the radical political ideology espoused by groups such as the Japanese Red Army and the Weather Underground had little appeal in largely prosperous and stable democratic societies. A traditional advantage that states had over sub-state groups was their ability to control information flows and utilize superior resources to delegitimize the terrorist cause and win '**the battle of hearts and minds**'.

The continued expansion of the number of Internet service providers, especially in states with relaxed or ambivalent content policies or legal authorities, as well as more capable and cheaper computers, software, peripherals, and wireless technologies, has '**empowered**' individuals and groups with the ability to post tracts on or send messages throughout the World Wide Web. Once limited to mimeographed manifestos, some terrorists and their supporters are now capable of building web sites to post any information they choose. For example, a web site sympathetic to the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement posted the group's communiqués and videos, which were accessed by international news agencies during the seizure of the Japanese embassy in Lima in 1997. Webmasters, who can be either groups or individuals, selectively control the content posted on their web sites. The web site of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam posts items that cast the group as a responsible, internationally 'accepted' organization (meeting delegates from the World Bank) committed to conflict resolution. As well as handling content control, and depending on the resources available and the intended audience, webmasters can tailor messages electronically in ways more appealing to specific segments of the population. For example, a posted Internet video entitled 'Dirty Kuffar' (non-believer) by 'Sheikh Terra' presents *jihadist* exhortations to a reggae beat. Messages, files, and polemics can be dispatched to almost anywhere on the globe with a connection to the Internet, or text messaging, almost instantaneously.

For the purposes of spreading messages to the widest possible audience for those without Internet or text messaging capabilities, and where speed of communication is not a requirement or a possibility for security reasons, terrorists need not rely exclusively on virtual methods. With a computer with modest capabilities, readily available software packages, and equipment such as printers and CD/DVD burners, members of terrorist groups and their sympathizers can create propaganda leaflets, posters, and multimedia presentations at very low cost in large quantities. Difficult to intercept and trace, the files for such materials can be e-mailed to other cells or groups to be modified to suit their specific message or mission with little chance of interception or prevention. More importantly, whereas offset printing machines and photocopiers are difficult to move, a laptop computer and printer can be packed in a suitcase, increasing the mobility of the terrorist cell generating the material and making them more

difficult to locate. Terrorist groups in Chechnya and the Middle East have also made increasing use of video cameras to record the preparations for and results of attacks, including successful roadside bombings and bringing down of helicopters. Video footage is useful in inspiring potential recruits and can be distributed to recruiters within the organization. The competition between global news outlets ensures that the images of successful and/or dramatic attacks reach the widest audience possible.

Coordination

During the era of transnational terrorism, groups planned and conducted individual attacks or mounted multiple attacks from a single staging base. The technologies associated with globalization have enabled terrorist cells and groups to mount coordinated attacks in different countries. Indeed, a hallmark of Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups is the conduct of multiple attacks in different locations concurrently. The simultaneous bombings of the US embassies in neighbouring countries in Africa in 1998 is one example. Another was the synchronized detonation of 10 of 13 bombs on packed commuter trains in Madrid in March 2004.

The technologies associated with globalization have allowed terrorist cell member and groups to operate independently at substantial distances from one another with a large degree of coordination. The Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) standard, for example, ensures that any compliant phone will work anywhere in the world where a GSM network has been established. E-mail and cell phone contact among group members allows geographically separated to conduct their attacks in separate locations or converge on a specific target area. For example, the 11 September 2001 hijackers utilized cheap and readily available pre-paid phone cards to communicate between cell leaders and senior leadership and, according to at least one press account, coordinated final attack authorization prior to the jets taking off from different locations. In the Madrid bombings mentioned above, cell phones were put to a more operational use as detonators.

The more successful terrorist groups have demonstrated an ability to retain a level of coordination in the face of tactical setbacks through technological and organizational adaptation. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, for example, fielded 'stealth' suicide boats designed to thwart Sri Lankan Navy radar systems. Surviving IRA bomb manufacturers were known for the technical complexity and ability to respond rapidly to British electronic countermeasures. A disturbing quality possessed by Al Qaeda is its ability to draw upon different levels of the organization to continue attacks even as the senior leaders regroup from setbacks suffered since December 2001. For example, they have provided funding and enabled other loosely affiliated groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, or sleeper cells have undertaken independent operations, to spread terrorist violence to another region. In addition, individuals considered expendable to Al Qaeda, such as Richard Reid (the 'Shoe Bomber'), are used to test out new methods designed to defeat security measures at little or no risk to the organization. The actions of affiliated groups, sleeper cells, and individuals sustain general fear by maintaining the perception of the depth, power, and reach of terrorist groups as global threats even as the senior leadership recovers from setbacks.

Security

Without adequate security terrorist cells can be detected, monitored, penetrated, and/or neutralized. Translations of captured Al Qaeda manuals, for example, make it clear that the senior leaders of the organization place a high value on security, including surveillance and counter-surveillance techniques. The technological enablers of globalization assist terrorist cells and leaders in preserving security in a number of ways, including distributing elements (see preceding section), moving around (see section below), and utilizing clandestine and/or encrypted communications.

The security of terrorist organizations has traditionally been assured by allowing only limited communication and information exchanges between cells, to ensure that if one cell is compromised its members only know each other's identities and not those of other cells. In this way, the damage done to the organization is minimized. The use of

specific codes and ciphers, known only to a few individuals, has been one way of preserving the security of an organization. Although code and ciphers inevitably have been broken, and information is obtained during interrogations, such activities take time. During that time, terrorist groups adjust their location and operating methods in an attempt to stay ahead of security and counter-terrorist forces. Computer advances, such as faster processing speeds, improved global connectivity, as well as developments in software technologies, enable clandestine communications between those with the capabilities to retrieve and decrypt them.

Terrorist groups have been able to leverage technological developments designed to shield a user's identity from unauthorized commercial or private exploitation (Gunartna 2002: 35). Concerns about infringements on civil liberties and privacy during the early years of the Internet led to the private development of encryption programs such as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). Available online as shareware, to be downloaded by anyone, PGP provides levels of encryption that are extremely costly and time consuming to break. In addition, access to hardware such as cell phones, personal data assistants, and computers can be restricted via the use of passwords. The use of Internet protocol address generators, anonymity protection programs, and rerouted communications, as well as private chat rooms where password-protected or encrypted files can be shared, also provide a degree of security. According to some press accounts, terrorists have also made ingenious use of common, remote-access e-mail accounts to leave messages for cell members without actually sending out anything that could be intercepted.

Mobility

As noted previously, the reduced size and increased power of personal electronics gives terrorists both unprecedented capabilities to proselytize and coordinate the activities of dispersed cells, but also added mobility as well. Mobility has always been a crucial consideration for terrorists and insurgents alike, given the superior resources that states have been able to bring to bear against them. In open societies that have well-developed infrastructures, terrorists have been able to move rapidly within and between borders, complicating the efforts of law enforcement and security services to track them. The globalization of commerce has influenced terrorist mobility as well. The volume of air travel and goods that pass through ports has increased exponentially over the past two decades. Between states, measures have been taken to ease the flow of goods, services, and ideas in a less restrictive fashion to improve efficiency and lower costs. Market demands for efficiencies of supply, manufacture, delivery, and cost have complicated efforts of states to prevent members of terrorist groups from exploiting gaps in security measures designed to deter or prevent illicit activities. Additional mobility also allows terrorist groups to train one another and share tactics, techniques, and methods, as the arrest of three members of the IRA suspected of training counterparts in the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Columbia (FARC) in Bogota in August 2001 appears to demonstrate.

The use of air travel by terrorists, as a means of mobility and attack, has been described in a number of books and newspaper accounts. Mohammed Atta, the suspected leader of the 11 September attacks, travelled extensively between Egypt, Germany, and the United States while studying and working. In this respect, the latest generation of terrorists resembles their transnational predecessors in exploiting travel methods for attacks. Terrorists' use of forms of transportation need not necessarily be overt in nature, as the volume of goods transported in support of a globalized economy is staggering and difficult to scrutinize effectively. For example, customs officials are hard-pressed to inspect every vehicle or container passing across a border or through a port. In the port of Los Angeles, the equivalent of 12,000 twenty-foot containers are processed daily. In at least one case in Italy in 2001, a suspected Al Qaeda terrorist was discovered inside a shipping container, modified for comfort, which was bound for the United States.

Lethality

Although the net effect that elements of globalization have had on terrorism is troubling, the one

element that concerns counter-terrorism experts and practitioners the most is future catastrophic attacks using weapons of mass destruction. During the transnational era, terrorists could obtain advanced weapons to conduct attacks, including guided missiles, rudimentary radiological weapons (more commonly know as '**dirty bombs**'), and biological or chemical weapons, but they largely did not. Only a few groups tried to acquire them and fewer still, including the Weather Underground, threatened their use. The precise reasons why terrorists did not acquire and use radiological, biological, or chemical weapons during this era are unclear. Experts speculated, however, that terrorist leaders understood that the more lethal their attacks were, the greater the likelihood that a state or the international community would focus their entire efforts on hunting them down and eradicating them.

More recently, senior leaders and operatives of terrorist groups have not only expressed a desire to acquire such weapons—but demonstrated the will to use them as well. For example, the Japanese cult Aum Shinryko manufactured and used nerve gas in the Tokyo subway system in 1995. The Al Qaeda manual entitled 'Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants', discovered during a raid on a suspected cell in Manchester, England in May 2000, outlines the basic steps for manufacturing and using biological and chemical toxins. Documents recovered in Afghanistan survey plans by Al Qaeda to produce specific types of biological and chemical weapons in quantity. In addition, other evidence appears to show the live testing of a chemical agent to determine its lethality. Statements by Osama bin Laden have underscored that all available means, including weapons of mass destruction, should be used in attacks to kill as many infidels and apostates as possible and cripple the US economy, which is both the icon for and the main engine of globalization. In an ironic twist related to the interconnection between terrorism and the influence of globalized media, a motivating element behind the fascination of senior Al Qaeda leaders with mass casualty attacks such as 'Operation Bojinka' is allegedly the spectacular scenes of destruction contained in a number of Hollywood blockbuster films.

Although the senior leaders of Al Qaeda would prefer to conduct another dramatic attack to restore some of their credibility lost since the collapse of the Taliban in Afghanistan, such attacks take time to plan, organize, and conduct even without inevitable delays. Globalization has facilitated access to weapons and resources required to conduct smaller, but still lethal attacks. In particular, affiliated groups

Box 21.4 Operation Bojinka

During the 1998 trial of Ramzi Yousef, for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the details of a planned set of attacks codenamed 'Operation Bojinka' were revealed which demonstrate Al Qaeda's ambitious goals. Bojinka was conceived as a two-part operation. During the first phase, the terrorist cell operating in the Philippines would assassinate Pope John Paul II during a scheduled visit in January 1995. With international attention diverted by the death of the pontiff, Al Qaeda operatives would carry out the second phase the following week. Five or more terrorists would plant bombs on between 11 and 14 aircraft, designed to detonate almost simultaneously while the flights were transiting across the Pacific Ocean. Modest estimates, should the attacks have succeeded, place the number of casualties close to the figure for those who perished in the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001.

(Derived from 'Operation Bojinka' (n.d.), *Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia*, online at: **http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bojinka**)

Box 21.5 Key concepts

Terrorism: the use of illegitimate violence by sub-state groups to inspire fear, by attacking civilians and/or symbolic targets. This is done for purposes such as drawing widespread attention to a grievance, provoking a severe response, or wearing down their opponent's moral resolve, to effect political change. Determining when the use of violence is legitimate, which is based on the contextual morality of the act as opposed to its effects, is the source for disagreement over what constitutes acts of terrorism.

Combating terrorism: this is comprised of anti-terrorism efforts (measures to protect against or mitigate future terrorist attacks) and counter-terrorism efforts (proactive actions designed to retaliate against or forestall terrorist actions).

have obtained and used or tried to obtain from black and grey market sources advanced weapons such as **manportable air defence systems** (MANPADS, or portable surface-to-air missiles) to bring down civilian airliners. Terrorist groups from Chechnya to Sri Lanka have shared their expertise in the manufacturing of lethal bombs triggered by increasingly sophisticated, but commercially available, communications and remote control devices. **Improved explosive devices** (IEDs), especially those packed into large vehicles, are likely to remain the preferred terrorist method of attack, given the ease of manufacture and use, as well as the difficulties associated with countering them.

Key points

- Elements of globalization that permit the rapid exchange of ideas and goods can also be leveraged and exploited by terrorist groups.
- The technologies associated with globalization allow terrorists to operate in a highly distributed global 'network' that shares information and allows small cells to conduct highly coordinated, lethal attacks.
- Globalization may allow some terrorist groups to acquire, manufacture, and use weapons of mass destruction in order to conduct catastrophic attacks.

Combating terrorism

The leaders of states plagued by transnational terrorism responded individually and collectively to combat it. Individual states undertook a range of activities that varied in scope, breadth, and quality, including the passage of anti-terrorism laws, preventive measures such as security precautions at airports, and the creation of military and paramilitary counter-terrorism forces such as the West German Grenzschutzgruppe-9 (GSG-9). Successful hostage rescues in Entebbe (1976), Mogadishu (1977), and Prince's Gate, London (1980) demonstrated that national counter-terrorism forces could operate effectively both domestically and abroad. A rules-based approach to tackling the problem, founded on the principles of international law and collective action, proved to be less successful. Although attempts to define and proscribe transnational terrorism in the United Nations bogged down in debate in the General Assembly over semantics, other cooperative initiatives were successfully implemented. These included the conventions adopted through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to improve information sharing, and legal cooperation including the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970). Another collective response to improve information sharing and collaborate action was the creation of the Public Safety and Terrorism Sub-Directorate within Interpol in 1985. Additional legislative measures were undertaken against terrorism during this period, such as the Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979), but most initiatives and responses throughout this decade were largely unilateral or regional and ad hoc in nature.

State leaders disagree on how best to deal with the current form of global terrorist violence on the basis of expediency, legitimacy, and legality. Much of the controversy relates to the nature of the threat and approach that should be taken to deal with it. Some national leaders view Al Qaeda as the nexus of a global consortium of terrorist groups, which have repeatedly demonstrated a desire to inflict as many casualties as possible upon civilian targets. With no possible latitude for negotiation or compromise with terrorist groups who seek to replace the existing international system with a much more restrictive

one, these leaders suggest that all states have an interest in engaging in a '**war on terrorism**', led by the United States, to deal with the threat. The stakes in this war consist of the preservation of basic freedoms and a way of life. Some freedoms may have to be constrained, but not abrogated, as the war will last for a decade or longer. In addition, the war should be viewed in terms of a prolonged global counter-insurgency campaign, where all instruments of national power must be integrated and harnessed to separate the most extreme terrorist elements from their sources of support, capture or destroy them, mitigate the underlying causes that motivate individuals to become terrorists, and protect civilian populations. Given the global, distributed, and elusive nature of the threat, which can strike at any time, the best approach for dealing with global terrorism before other catastrophic attacks occur is to leverage military forces in a '**coalition of the willing**'. Coalition military forces, working with national forces, are structured and have the capabilities to lead efforts that will deny terrorist groups sanctuaries in ungoverned or ungovernable sections of the globe, while law enforcement officials locate and deny access to international sources of funding and support. By dealing with threats to the common rights and welfare of nations overseas now, as well as bolstering domestic capabilities to identify, track, and respond to internal terrorist threats, those in favour of a war on terror seek to prevent more devastating attacks from occurring on national soil.

Other national leaders are uneasy with the concept of 'war' against terrorism. They view actions led by the military as likely to lead to terrorist reprisals in an unending cycle of violence. In their eyes, terrorism is a crime that is best dealt with through law-enforcement methods. By dealing with terrorism as a police problem, states uphold the rule of law, maintain the high moral ground, preserve democratic principles, and prevent the establishment of martial law. Military force should only be used in extreme circumstances and even then its use may have negative consequences. Terrorism is best dealt with inside state borders and through cooperative international law-enforcement efforts to arrest subjects and provide them with due process. The law-enforcement approach to terrorism must balance taking enough measures against terrorist groups without crossing over into the realm of ' "political justice," where the rules and rights enshrined in the principle of due process are either willfully misinterpreted or completely disregarded' (Chalk 1996: 98). To do little against domestic or global terrorism, in the name of upholding the rule of law, risks offering terrorist groups a sanctuary and the security of rights and laws to which they are not entitled, as terrorists are seeking to subvert the systems which protect them.

Although disagreements still exist over the best approach to pursue terrorists actively, the two biggest problems are locating terrorists and isolating them from their means of support and sustenance. Locating and identifying terrorists is a tedious and time-consuming process that requires collecting, assessing, and analysing information collected from a range of technical and human sources. Information technologies associated with globalization, which many states possess, are useful in assisting this process. Such technologies allow terrorist patterns to be identified prior to attacks and assist in evaluating evidence collected after attacks, with systems capable of performing calculations measured in the trillions per second (floating point operations, or flops). Terrorist financial and organizational information can be compared using forms of link analysis to construct a more comprehensive picture of how the terrorist elements interact. In addition, huge volumes of information can be reduced and exchanged electronically between departments, agencies, and other governments or made available on secure servers whose capacities are measured in terabytes. Discovering terrorist cells, however, has as much to do with pursuing non-technical leads and mistakes. Although technology speeds the process, rebuilding key intelligence deficiencies, pursuing individuals globally, and adequately mapping the network of organizations and individuals still takes time.

In order to deal with global terrorism, the international community must address one of its most problematic aspects: the appeal of messages that inspire terrorists to commit horrific acts of violence. Collective law- enforcement and military actions are successful in removing temporarily or permanently current members of terrorist organizations. Although such actions may dissuade some individuals from taking up terrorist causes, they do little to halt the promotion of extremist interpretations of

religion or political theory that occurs under the guise of 'education'. In the case of Islam, for example, radical mullahs and imams twist the tenets of the religion into a doctrine of action and hatred, where spiritual achievement occurs through destruction rather than personal Enlightenment. In other words, suicide attacks offer the promise of immediate spiritual accomplishment and relieve the individual of the burden of a lifetime of piety and positive contributions to the community. Precisely how the processes and technologies of globalization can assist in delegitimizing the pedagogy that incites terrorists will remain one of the most vexing challenges for the international community for years to come.

Key points

- States, individually and collectively, have political, military, legal, economic, and technological advantages in the struggle against terrorist groups.
- Differences between states over the nature and scope of the current terrorist threat, and the most appropriate responses to combat it, reflect subjective characterizations based on national biases and experiences.

Conclusion

Terrorism remains a complex phenomenon in which violence is used to obtain power and redress political, social, and/or economic grievances that have grown more widespread, or acute, to many through the process of globalization. Globalization has improved the technical capabilities of terrorists and given them global reach, but has not altered the fundamental fact that terrorism is the weakest form of irregular warfare, representing the extreme views of a limited minority of the global population. In other words, globalization has changed the scope of terrorism but not its nature. Although globalization has improved the technical capabilities of sub-state groups and individuals, it has not conveyed one-sided or absolute benefits to terrorists. The same technologies and processes giving terrorism its global reach also enable more effective means of states to combat them. The only hope for success that terrorists have in the long run is the widespread uprising of the disaffected and oppressed, or the collapse of their adversary after a crippling attack. Terrorist and counter-terrorist campaigns are characterized by prolonged struggle to maintain advantages in legitimacy domestically and internationally. The challenge for the global community will be in utilizing its advantages to win the war of ideas that motivates and sustains those responsible for the current wave of terrorist violence.

For further information and case studies on this subject, please visit the companion web site at **www.oup.com/uk/booksites/politics**.

QUESTIONS

1. Why is linking terrorism with globalization so difficult to do theoretically?
2. When did terrorism become a truly global phenomenon and what enabled it to do so?
3. In what ways are the technologies and processes associated with globalization more beneficial to states or terrorists?

4 Given that terrorism has been both a transnational and a global phenomenon, why has it not been more successful in effecting change?

5 Of all of the factors that motivate terrorists, is any one more important than others and if so, why?

6 What has changed in terrorism over the past half century and have any factors remained the same? If so, what are they and why have they remained constant?

7 What is the role that technology plays in terrorism and will it change how terrorists operate in the future? If so, how?

8 What are the dilemmas that terrorist groups face with respect to weapons of mass destruction?

9 What is the primary challenge that individual states and the international community as a whole face in confronting terrorism?

10 How can globalization be useful in diminishing the underlying causes of terrorism?

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

Burton, P. (ed.) (2003), *Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism* (Surrey: Jane's Information Group). An annual reference work containing summaries of insurgent and terrorist group issues, important events, and evolving trends.

Davis, P., and Jenkins, B. M. (2002), *Deterrence and Influence in Counter-terrorism: A Component in the War on Al Qaeda* (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND). The authors offer a holistic strategy to combat Al Qaeda that accounts for deterring and influencing terrorist groups but recognizes the difficulties in doing so against a networked, adaptive adversary.

Drake, C. J. M. (1998), *Terrorists' Target Selection* (New York: St. Martin's). The author captures similarities in the selection rationale, targeting process, and priorities of different terrorist groups.

Greenberg, M. (2002), *Terrorist Financing* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations). This report, available online from the Council on Foreign Relations web site (**www.cfr.org**), assesses Al Qaeda's financial network, US responses since 11 September to dismantle it, and recommendations on how to improve national and international cooperation against this aspect of terrorism.

Hoffman, B. (1998), *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press). A lucid survey of the problems, trends, and developments in terrorism and a useful starting point for those interested in understanding the complex phenomenon of terrorism.

Juergensmeyer, M. (2000), *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press). An excellent study that highlights the commonalities among disparate and theologically diverse group leaders who use religion to justify the use of violence against civilians.

National War College Student Task Force on Combating Terrorism (2002), *Combating Terrorism in a Globalized World* (Washington, DC: National War College). A student project undertaken after 11 September, this document subsequently became the basis for the *U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*.

Pillar, P. (2001), *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press). An interesting overview of the actions that the United States should take against international terrorism based on the author's practical experience in counter-terrorism.

Schmid, A. P., Jongman, A. J., *et al.* (1988), *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books). A helpful, if at times elusive, reference work for further research that highlights the methodological problems associated with the study of terrorism.

Stern, J. (1999), *The Ultimate Terrorists* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Provides much information on weapons of mass destruction and the ease with which terrorists can acquire them.

WEB LINKS

Terrorism Research Centre: **www.terrorism.com/index.shtml**.

This useful site has an excellent links section, including links to relevant reports and terrorism news.

This is Baader-Meinhof: **www.baader-meinhof.com/index.htm**.

This site contains information related to transnational terrorism, and in particular, the German Baader-Meinhof group. It has a section for students and researchers as well as links to or the complete text of seminal works such as Carlos Marighella's 'Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla'. **www.baader-meinhof.com/students/resources/print/manual.html**.

US State Department—Patterns of Global Terrorism Annual Report: **www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/**.

Archived from 1995 upwards, these reports contains valuable information and trends analysis on American perceptions of terrorism and the threat it poses.

Terrorism Files: **www.terrorismles.org** .

A useful collection of news items, terrorist group overviews, individuals, and incidents.

Special Operations Web site: **www.specialoperations.com**.

Exhaustive collection devoted to all aspects of special operations, including national counter-terrorism units and historical operations.

RAND Corporation: **www.rand.org/publications/electronic/gse.html**.

Well known for the quality of its reports and established interest in terrorism, this link points to a number of reports on issues related to terrorism and other global security issues.

The 'Terrorism as a Global Issue' Web portal: **www.un.org/partners/civil_society/m-terror.htm**.

This Web portal, hosted by the United Nations, provides links to historical documents, summaries of events, and other web sites on international issues and actions related to terrorism.