Shifting the paradigm

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This is the second half of a two-part article. The first appeared in the preceding issue.[1]

One result of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center has been an increased willingness to reflect on the state of the wider world, to consider the growing disparity between the rich and the poor, to recognize the stresses induced by modernity, to acknowledge the growing imbalance in the global economy, and to question the overwhelming dominance of Western political and economic orthodoxies.

There were, of course, numerous critiques of the global situation long before 11 September.[2] Many of them went beyond advocating different priorities and policies to press for a shift in the paradigm that underlies Western global policy, something that is easier said than done. Even if one accepts the need for fundamental change, how does one define or describe the prevailing paradigm?[3] Which parts of it need to be changed, and to what? And how does one set about doing so? There is no encouragement from the national security establishment to make the attempt. Realists to a man (or woman), they note that the prevailing paradigm is deterministic, a product of the 'system' and of human nature reaching back to the Treaty of Westphalia, Thucydides and beyond.

This is unduly fatalistic. The first part of this article argued that the paradigm which shaped Western foreign policy behaviour after the Second World War

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[1] Michael McCGwire, 'The paradigm that lost its way', *International Affairs* 77: 4, Oct. 2001, pp. 777–803.

[2] In the first part of this article, I used two of these to substantiate my doubts about the capacity of the international system to handle emerging global and local problems: John D. Steinbruner, *Principles of global security* (Washington DC: Brookings, 2000); Paul Rogers, *Losing control: global security in the twenty-first century* (London: Pluto Press, 2000).

[3] The term 'paradigm' has evolved from an arcane expression used by Thomas Kuhn in explaining the structure of scientific revolutions into an everyday term that in the spirit of Humpty Dumpty can be taken to mean whatever one says it does. In the field of international relations, the 'prevailing paradigm' may refer to the establishment view of the art of the possible, the body of assumptions that underlie foreign policy, the dominant school of international theory, or some mix of these and a subsidiary paradigm. It has become a convenient umbrella term that covers how one 'sees' the international system or one's 'approach' to international relations (or some aspect of it, such as security), and extends to include doctrine, models and habits of mind, all of which have the potential to shape policies and patterns of behaviour, which (in turn) can be used to 'describe' a paradigm.

was primarily a product of the circumstances and personalities that prevailed in the period 1945–53. Those were exceptional times. Requirements for US national security (a new concept in 1945) provided the rationale for this *national security paradigm*, which lay at the heart of Western foreign and defence policy, and became entrenched in the course of the Cold War. Not only is this paradigm less than 60 years old, but its shape was not predetermined. Had Roosevelt remained at the helm for another twelve months, his political stature, individual style, personal control of policy and political astuteness would most likely have ensured that the nature and course of Soviet–American relations were significantly different.[4] And what if Wallace or Byrnes had been chosen as his running-mate in 1944, rather than Truman?[5]

The historical review reached the conclusion that whatever its utility in 1945–53, the national security paradigm is now dysfunctional. With its adversarial attitudes and its reluctance to cooperate or compromise, the paradigm can only add to the global problems that lie ahead—be they environmental, socio-economic or military–political—rather than provide a framework for solving them. To go back to the paradigm's origin, the problem with the underlying geopolitical requirements was only partly their ambitious geographical scope—the Eurasian landmass, and the subsequent extension to its trading periphery—which created a correspondingly extensive range of threats. More important was the way that America (abetted by Britain) moved away from Roosevelt's policy of cooperative engagement with Russia,[6] to an increasingly adversarial stance. Within a year of Roosevelt's death, the new political consensus in Washington (strongly supported by London) was that the Soviet Union was an enemy and should be treated as such. And this despite the judgement of US military intelligence that there was little danger of Soviet adventurism and that Stalin would only risk military action if he felt that Soviet security were seriously endangered by US initiatives or deliberate US obstruction.[7] It was the far-reaching effect of this attitudinal shift that prompted me to define the national security paradigm (NSP) in terms of attitudes and consequential patterns of behaviour, rather than goals, concepts and policies.

Expressed in those terms, a key factor of the paradigm was a readiness to adopt an adversarial stance and to classify the adversary as 'enemy'. Another was to

[4] Roosevelt believed that national interests, not ideology, had top priority in Soviet policy. He favoured a cooperative relationship with Moscow, and George Kennan's damning psycho-ideological assessment of the Kremlin leadership is unlikely to have prevailed in his administration. It is relevant that General Lucius Clay (US military governor in Germany) disagreed vehemently with Kennan's analysis, and his opinion was supported by many of the senior US army officers (including Eisenhower) who were dealing with their Soviet counterparts in Germany on a day-to-day basis.

[5] In 1944 Henry Wallace was the serving Vice-President and James Byrnes was 'assistant' to the President for domestic problems. Harry Truman, a Senator from Kansas, was chosen as being less likely to cost the Democrat ticket votes than Wallace, an outspoken New Dealer, and Byrnes, a lapsed Catholic and a southerner.

[6] This included acknowledging Russia's legitimate interests (security, in particular) and the even-handed interpretation of ambiguities in the wartime agreements (especially Yalta). See Melvyn P. Leffler, 'Adherence to agreements', *International Security* 11: 1, Summer 1986.

[7] See MccGwire, 'The paradigm that lost its way', pp. 781–2.

dehumanize the adversary, who was depicted at best as unreasonable and dangerously obstructive, and more often as a single-minded fanatic of evil intent, who was not open to persuasion but responded to the threat of force.[8] The adversary was demonized. Dehumanization denied him any rights, including legitimate interests, even those involving national security and sovereignty.[9] Delegitimizing one's opponent increases one's own sense of legitimacy and moral rectitude, making it easier to justify one's own behaviour while ignoring the adversary's interests, explaining he is not open to reason. It encourages double standards.

Negotiation ceases to be a cooperative endeavour and provides the opportunity for imposing one's will on the adversary. Inverting Clausewitz, negotiation becomes war by other means, a form of offensive diplomacy that is backed by a readiness to use force and even to risk war.[10] The need to win and to be seen to win (for reasons of international credibility and domestic politics) makes it hard to compromise with the 'enemy', for to do so could be seen as appeasement or a reward for intransigence. Indeed, the belief that conciliation indicates weakness means that compromise by an adversary is something to be exploited rather than reciprocated: a lesson he learns to his cost.

The national security paradigm includes features such as the self-image of 'the magistrate and the malefactor' and omits others such as the prudential obligation to be 'fair'. At its core lies an adversarial view of international relations and a distrust of cooperative engagement,[11] although these are not necessarily at odds. They become antithetical when combined with an *exclusionary* rather than an *inclusive* approach to international security. Of comparable importance to this central antithesis is the relationship between deterrence and reassurance.[12] In the field of strategic weapons, these two concepts were meant to work in tandem, but there was an inherent conflict between the different requirements, if only because reassurance called for self-restraint, while there were (and are) no inherent limits on deterrence.[13] In the 1970s and 1980s, the urge for deterrence invariably prevailed over the requirements for reassurance.

Exclusivity, adversarial, deterrence—these terms lay at the heart of the national security paradigm, as it emerged in 1945–53 and evolved thereafter. Add 'demonize' to the three terms, plus an emphasis on military preponderance and the readiness to use force, and they could be strung together to yield a crude word-picture.[14]

[8] The intellectual justification for this view was provided by George Kennan's 'Long Telegram'.

[9] For the line of reasoning that led to this situation in respect to the Soviet Union see MccGwire, 'The paradigm that lost its way', p. 787.

[10] Ibid., pp. 783–4, 789.

[11] In *Principles of global security*, Steinbruner advocates a shift in the balance of US security policy, moving from deterrence and containment to reassurance, and from active confrontation to cooperative engagement. He identifies the latter as a key strategic principle that seeks to achieve its purpose through institutional consent rather than the threat of material or physical coercion, and argues (p. 4) that 'cooperation . . . is as integral to the human experience as battle'.

[12] Steinbruner considers that present US policies towards Russia and China, which rely on domination and deterrence, containment and active confrontation, exacerbate what are inherently dangerous situations. In his view, cooperative engagement and reassurance are the essential prerequisites for global security. See *Principles of global security*, ch. 6.

[13] MccGwire, 'The paradigm that lost its way', pp. 790–2.

[14] Ibid., pp. 801–2.

It is, however, more useful to flesh out the description by drawing on the analysis in the first part of this article to add to the list of attitudes that characterize the paradigm. Counterposing each term with its antonym (or approximate) yields a collection of dyads of the kind just discussed: adversarial/cooperative, exclusionary/inclusive, deter/reassure. This gives a more rounded picture of the attitudes that make up the prevailing paradigm and—equally important—highlights those that do not.

Using assorted parts of speech, these quasi-antonyms have been grouped under four arbitrary (and overlapping) headings, giving some sense of the attitudes and behaviour that have tended to prevail when dealing with states categorized as 'adversary'. It is not claimed that this was invariably the case, and there is no pretence that attitudes on one side of the divide are always preferable or appropriate, and those on the other are not. The listing does, however, give a sense of *what* it is that needs to be changed in our approach to international relations in general and security in particular.

- *Relationships*: exclude vs include; confrontation vs detente; dominate vs engage; enmity vs rivalry vs partnership; autonomous vs collaborate.
- *Diplomacy:* adversarial vs cooperative; intransigent vs compromise; unfair vs fair; unilateral vs reciprocal; dictate vs negotiate; oppose vs co-opt; deny vs accommodate; exploit vs reciprocate; zero-sum vs expanding-sum; must-win vs win some/lose some.
- *Power*: compel vs persuade; punish vs reward; vengeful vs magnanimous; conflict vs conciliation; disrespect vs respect; superiority vs equivalence; preponderance vs sufficiency; worst case vs most likely case.
- *Security*: unequal vs equal; deter vs reassure; cooerce vs cooperate; win vs not-lose; national vs international; micro vs macro.

Towards cooperative global security[15]

I was sensitized to the importance of 'attitudes' when working in the field of Soviet–American relations.[16] In the early 1980s I had reached the uncomfortable conclusion that the ideological attitudes that fuelled the confrontational policies of the first Reagan administration constituted a greater danger of war (albeit inadvertent) than any Soviet urge to aggression.[17] I also came to realize that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence induced and encouraged the kind of attitudes that increased tension and made inadvertent war more likely.

[15] This concept was first explored in Janne E. Nolan, ed., *Global engagement: cooperation and security in the 21st century* (Washington DC: Brookings, 1994). See 'The paradigm that lost its way', p. 398, for the origins of this project and the Cooperative Security Consortium.

[16] I was then at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

[17] The public perception of this danger was evidenced in the sharp increase in support for anti-nuclear and peace movements at this time. The situation was summed up neatly by the aphorism (quoted by Georgiy Arbartov, but credited to the brother of the President of West Germany) that the danger of war in US policy lay in the conduct of policy as if there were no danger of war.

The second half of the 1980s saw a shift in attitudes, when Gorbachev's accession to the leadership in Moscow coincided with a more moderate administration in Washington. Although the Reagan presidency rebuffed Gorbachev's call for 'new political thinking about international relations', the Soviet leader's campaign was not without effect. Within two years, the adoption by a superpower of that clearly articulated objective, reflecting as it did the principles of the UN Charter and the conclusions of the Palme Commission Report, had been largely instrumental in bringing about the relaxation of international tension from the heights it reached in the first half of the 1980s. It was achieved *without* noticeably softening Soviet policy towards America (that shift took place in spring 1987) and *before* the first concrete evidence of the change in Soviet military doctrine (the asymmetrical INF treaty signed in December 1987). Such is the influence of attitudes.

There are advantages in describing a paradigm in terms of its constituent 'attitudes'. While concepts and policies will change to reflect external developments, attitudes are largely unaffected; and, by providing a consistent measure of a core element over time, they allow one to identify the essence of the paradigm. When seeking to shift a paradigm, this persistence might seem a handicap, given the difficulty in changing prejudices towards ethnic and religious groups, countries, races and the opposite sex. However, the attitudes underlying the NSP are of a different kind and bear a closer resemblance to those in the world of business or (more particularly) in the field of sport, which is overtly adversarial. It is noticeable that many of the descriptors on the 'dysfunctional' side of the attitudinal account are seen as commendable in a sporting context, particularly in the case of body-contact team games. Off the field, these attitudes are seen as socially dysfunctional, and players adapt their behaviour accordingly. In the case of the NSP, we are talking of 'bad habits' rather than ingrained beliefs.

It is plausible that there was a shift in the attitudes of George Bush Snr during the first six months of 1990, in the period following the Malta mini-summit the previous December and culminating in his reference to an emerging 'new world order' when addressing Congress in September that year. One has the impression that Bush cast off the adversarial constraints of the national security paradigm, was sensitive to the problems facing Gorbachev, and was willing to do what he could to assist the Soviet Union withdraw from eastern Europe and the arms race in a dignified manner and with due consideration for its legitimate security concerns.[18] Subsequently, following the successful outcome of the Gulf War, Bush invited the Soviet Union to co-sponsor the ground-breaking Madrid Peace Conference on the Arab–Israeli conflict at the end of October 1991.[19]

[18] For example, he ordered the withdrawal of US tactical missiles from Europe so as to facilitate Gorbachev's programme to redeploy Soviet nuclear weapons from the newly independent republics and concentrate them on the territory of the Russian Federation. See Janne E. Nolan, *An elusive consensus: nuclear weapons and American security after the Cold War* (Washington DC: Brookings, 1999), p. 106, n. 41.

[19] The conference brought together Israel, the Arab states on its borders and the PLO. It led to the Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel in 1993 and 1995, and the Wye Plantation talks between Israel and Syria at the end of 1995.

Little more than a year later, Bush offered to organize a major UN military operation to ensure the delivery of relief supplies in Somalia, and the first US units arrived in early December.[20] At the end of that month, Bush warned Milosevic that if Serbia brought war to Kosovo, it would be seen as a direct threat to US interests; a detachment of 300 US troops was deployed to Macedonia to underline the commitment. The last two initiatives may just have been responding to events; they were, however, unusual in taking place during a presidential transition and were seen at the time as new and heartening departures. If so, these examples reinforce the contention that attitudes can change.

The use of an attitudinal paradigm is particularly apposite at this time of continuing post-Cold War triumphalism. Paradigmatic shifts tend to follow defeat (Germany in the 1930s) or failure (the Soviet Union in the late 1980s), while success discourages experimentation; if it ain't broke, don't fix it.[21] However, while it would be hard to persuade a 'victor' to renounce a view of international relations that was framed in terms of concepts or policies, it could be possible to effect a progressive change in attitudes, which could lead to different patterns of behaviour. In practical terms, it may be the only option available.

For example, the last chapter of John Steinbruner's comprehensive exposition of the *Principles of global security* discusses the transformation in security relationships that must take place if global security is to be ensured. Recommending the book, General Lee Butler asks whether the United States has the will and the wisdom to make such a reorientation,[22] which (to quote Steinbruner) would involve 'a basic shift in organising principles from confrontation to reassurance and from contingency reaction to anticipatory prevention'. Steinbruner is not optimistic and, in his final section, which summarizes what would be required of the United States in such circumstances, he concludes (by implication) that there would need to be a fundamental change in US attitudes for such a conceptual and policy transformation to take place.[23]

A quite separate advantage of the attitudinal approach is that it highlights the reflexive aspects of foreign and security policy. It is the reflexive element that distinguishes paradigms in the applied world of the policy sciences from those in the theoretical world of the physical sciences. To state the obvious, above the quantum level, the objects of scientific analysis and speculation are not affected

[20] Some 350,000 people had been killed in Somalia between 1988 and 1992. The UN force totalled 37,000 troops but its primary combat capability was an authorized force of 28,000 US troops, spearheaded by a marine expeditionary force. The US offer was made on 25 November, during the presidential transition period. See Steinbruner, *Principles of global security*, pp. 155–63.

[21] Steinbruner stressed the difficulty of effecting change in 'grand strategy' (a paradigm shift) of the kind that is currently needed. He noted that despite the favourable conditions arising from the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and America's position as the sole superpower, a 1997 review of US national security failed to challenge the fundamentals of a policy that had been designed to counter the Soviet communist threat during the previous fifty years.

[22] Gen. Butler, USAF ret., was C-in-C US Strategic Command 1991–4. One of several eminent and well-qualified people to recommend Steinbruner's book, he asked 'whether the US, at the peak of its power, has the wisdom and will to reorient its deeply ingrained defence preferences from dominance and deterrence to equity and reassurance'.

[23] Steinbruner, *Principles of global security*, pp. 224–30.

by the choice of paradigm.[24] In the policy sciences, a shift in paradigm will not only affect the policy prescription, it will also affect the nature (behaviour) of the 'object(s)' being addressed, be this an individual, social group, economy or country.

In respect to interpersonal relations, our own experience tells us this is so, but to a significant extent it also applies to international relations, if only because governments are made up of people. This reflexivity is recognized in the concept of 'self-fulfilling prophecies', but it is too often ignored in the formulation of policy and sometimes dismissed. In 1946–7, US policy-makers were adamant that Soviet policies were a function of developments *within* the Soviet Union and were not related to American behaviour or attitudes, and this tenet endured until after Stalin's death.[25] More generally, deliberate neglect of the other side's interests was a feature of the NSP.

A final advantage of the attitudinal paradigm is its collective structure and the fact that each 'attitude' in the listing has some kind of (at least approximate) antonym. Collectively, these quasi-antonyms yield a coherent alternative to the prevailing paradigm. Compare this with a paradigm defined/described in terms of concepts and policies. Assuming that a consensus is achieved on the need for change and its general direction, there will still be argument about which new concepts and policies should be chosen. With an attitudinal paradigm, the debate would be about emphases, not substance.

This allows answers to be formulated to the rhetorical questions, 'What needs to be changed' and 'To what'? The national security paradigm as currently constructed is increasingly dysfunctional and not only is ill-suited to the problems that lie ahead but is at the very root of those affecting security relationships. The objective is to move from the existing adversarial paradigm to a cooperative variant that explicitly recognizes that in a globalized nuclear world *there is no such thing as national security, only international security*. Affixing oversimplified labels, the desired shift is from the inherently adversarial national security paradigm (ANSP) to a consciously cooperative global security paradigm (CGSP).[26]

The 'nature' of the new paradigm is implicit in the collection of antonyms, but its final shape will be the outcome of a learning process, the shift being incremental and cumulative, rather than an abrupt attempt to match some theoretical world order. Just as the existing ANSP was largely a product of the circumstances of 1945–53, the final CGSP will be a product of the cooperative political processes

[24] E.g. the revolutionary shift from the geocentric Ptolomaic paradigm to the heliocentric Copernican paradigm had no effect on the behaviour of the sun or its planets. The work of Anthony Giddens opened my eyes to the centrality of the concept of reflexivity in all social interactions.

[25] Melvyn P. Leffler, 'The American conception of national security and the beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–48', Working Paper No. 48, International Security Studies Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, May 1983), pp. 72–3, fn. 105.

[26] It is perhaps relevant that the adversarial attitudes that characterize the prevailing paradigm turn out to be the antithesis of the attitudes advocated by all the major religions and world philosophies. This is because those bodies of thought are as much concerned with social harmony as with spiritual or intellectual enlightenment.

involved in engineering the shift, which are discussed in the next section.[27] Important but non-controversial principles can be adopted, such as the interrelatedness of the contemporary world, the interdependence of people, states and social systems, and the responsibility of the rich for the fate of humankind, a responsibility that bears particularly heavily on the major powers. But attempts to specify the lineaments of an alternative paradigm (a blueprint for some new world order) should be avoided as counterproductive and possibly dangerous.[28]

At this juncture, the article changes gear, moving on from how to think about the recent past to ideas about structuring the future in such a way that the gloomy prognoses are not fulfilled. While attitudes are not the only thing that need to change, they lie at the core of Western behaviour, and the reflexive factor means that they have unusual leverage. They are also (nominally) within our control.

It is hoped that outlining the prerequisites for effecting a paradigm shift of the kind described, identifying the obstacles to any such change, and suggesting how these could be addressed and the process precipitated, will prompt others to take up the challenge and take the debate on further. A great deal has been written about what is wrong and what needs to be done to make it right. Relatively little is said about how this might be brought about before it is too late.

Progressive change is often waiting in the wings, unable to come on stage until an obstacle or obstacles are removed. It used to be assumed that Soviet communism was the obstacle to world order and global harmony, but the history of the last ten years shows that not to have been the case. Is enough attention paid to obstacles in the way of change? Could it be that the obstacle is us?

Engineering a paradigm shift

The discussion begins with a cursory review of four attempts at a paradigm shift,[29] before moving on to consider whether the present situation is ripe for engineering a shift from an ANSP to a CGSP, and if not, what could be done about it. On the basis of observation and common sense, there would seem to be four prerequisites for such a shift:

- an *impulse* for change, deriving from *shared fears* and a *common vision* of an alternative;
- the absence or removal of *obstacles* to change;

[27] I understand that in theoretical terms, this approach may come within the scope of 'weak cognitivism' (*Review of International Studies* 26: 1, 2000, pp. 25–30). However, I suspect that 'attitudes' do not qualify as 'norms', as they are concerned with manners rather than morals (*International Organisation*, 52: 4, 1998, p. 891). Nor do they qualify as 'rules', since those have to be mutually recognized. Attitudes are unilateral and the resultant paradigm is imposed on the weak by the strong.

[28] This is not to belittle the special commissions set up by the UN General Assembly. Dated, but still outstanding examples of such work are found in the influential reports by Willy Brandt on international development (1977), Olaf Palme on disarmament and security (1980) and Gro Harlem Bruntland on environment and development (1983).

[29] The Rio Treaty/Kyoto Accords could be seen as a paradigm in the process of shifting. The process is comparable to that underlying a 'normative change', the abolition of slavery and women's suffrage being emblematic examples. See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International norm dynamics and political change', *International Organisation* 52: 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 887–917.

- an *engine* of change;
- a *precipitating* cause or event.

The process of establishing the European Community/Union is a textbook example of this model. Driven by the carnage of two world wars and the certainty that any future war would spell the destruction of their homelands, a small group of far-sighted European statesmen rejected the existing paradigm, where war between their countries was an immutable feature of the international system, and envisioned a new kind of evolving political structure and new ways of resolving disagreements that would achieve the goal of a war-free Europe.[30]

French concerns about German resurgence and domination constituted a serious *obstacle* to change; these were initially met by US guarantees and subsequently by the binding of Germany into NATO. The *engine* of change was provided by the Council of Ministers and the Commission, which established procedures that drove the negotiating process forward via successive deadlines, subsidiary agreements and additional treaties. Contemporary developments, most especially the need to reconcile French and German concerns about the Ruhr in 1947, served as *precipitator*. This resulted in an administrative structure that enabled the formation in 1951 of the European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor to the EEC.

The campaign that Gorbachev launched in December 1984 for 'new political thinking about international relations' was an unsuccessful attempt at a paradigm shift. His argument was based on a broad analysis of world affairs—political, economic and environmental—but its immediacy stemmed from a widespread conviction within the Soviet leadership that the relentless arms race and the confrontational policies of the Reagan administration must inevitably lead to accidental or inadvertent nuclear war.[31] Despite the attention it received from non-NATO nations and from non-governmental elites in the West, Gorbachev's attempt was bound to fail; for neither his fears nor his vision were shared by Western leaders, who dismissed his call for 'new political thinking' as utopian propaganda.[32] Claiming that nuclear deterrence could be relied on to prevent nuclear war, they represented an insurmountable obstacle to change.

Gorbachev did, however, succeed in shifting a crucial sub-paradigm regarding the contingency of world war. For decades, both the Soviet Union and the West had based their military requirements on that danger. If the Soviet Union was not to lose such a war, it had to evict US forces from the continent and prevent their return, and this required troops forward-deployed in eastern Europe and an offensive posture. However, the Soviet Union came to realize

[30] Britain refused to join, conforming to the 'rule' that 'victors' do not favour change. EFTA, the free trade area promoted by Britain, was not an alternative *vision*, but an unsuccessful attempt to divert the European movement onto a non-visionary track.

[31] For a synopsis of the genesis and scope of Gorbachev's 'new political thinking', see Michael MccGwire, *Perestroika and Soviet national security* (Washington DC: Brookings, 1991), pp. 179–85. The summary draws predominantly on Gorbachev's speeches and statements through to the end of 1986, and makes considerable use of his own phraseology.

[32] This conforms to the rule: Moscow was facing up to the failure of the Soviet economic system; Washington and London could smell victory.

that in developing the capability 'not to lose' in a war they absolutely wanted to avoid, they had made such a war more likely; in 1987 the military was instructed to plan on the audacious assumption that there would be no world war, which would be averted by political means. This new sub-paradigm meant that eastern Europe was no longer essential as an offensive springboard and/or defensive glacis, there was no longer a requirement for Soviet conventional superiority facing NATO, and the Soviet Union could accept the elimination of intermediate nuclear missiles. This was the beginning of the end of the Cold War.[33]

The *impulse* for this successful shift was in large part the *fear* shared by military establishment and political leadership alike of inadvertent war and of 'sliding into the nuclear abyss'. This was powerfully reinforced by the realization that if economic perestroika were not to fail, there had to be a radical reduction in the allocation of resources to defence, which could be achieved only by withdrawing from the arms race. This realization doubled as *precipitator*. The *obstacle* to change had been the 'old guard', whose personal knowledge of events from 1920 to 1970 appeared to validate the Marxist/Leninist prognosis and obstructed the reworking of theory that would enable this and other changes in doctrine. The advent of Gorbachev marked the generational shift that removed this obstacle and provided the *engine* of change.

The UN Convention on the Third Law of the Sea (LOS III) exemplifies a rather different kind of paradigm shift. The centuries-old doctrine of 'freedom of the sea', so precious to the maritime powers for the distant access it provided for their trade and their warships, was replaced by a new body of treaty law that favoured the territorial and economic rights of coastal states and islands, constrained the free passage of warships through straits and archipelagos, and declared the deep seabed to be the common heritage of humankind.

Here the *impetus* for change came from (1) the *vision* shared by an overwhelming majority in the UN General Assembly, headed by a coalition of coastal states, led by Canada and Norway, and (2) the maritime powers' *fear* that their inability to enforce the old paradigm would lead to anarchy at sea, threatening their trade. The *obstacle* to change was originally these same maritime powers; however, facing the reality that coastal states were making rules to suit their particular circumstances, the traditional powers decided that the lesser evil was to negotiate a comprehensive agreement. The *engine* of change was the treaty-making process, which lasted 15 years (1968–82) and progressively brought about radical change in the attitudes of all nations towards the use of the sea and its resources. LOS III negotiations grew out of a General Assembly resolution (tabled by Malta) that the deep seabed should be designated the common heritage of humankind; this was the humble *precipitator*.[34]

[33] MccGwire, *Perestroika*, pp. 297–309.

[34] Crucial to the success of LOS III was Canada's total commitment to the project and the full-time involvement of a large and experienced delegation. Its head, Ambassador Allan Beasley, had Ottowa's full confidence, the subject was high on the national agenda, and Beasley's personal stature and input, both at the UN and world-wide between sessions, was an important factor in the successful outcome of the project.

It can be seen that the nominal prerequisites for effecting a paradigm shift (impulse, engine, precipitator) are disarmingly simple, but it is no surprise that the obstacles to change are formidable. In the case of shifting from the ANSP to a CGSP, they impact on both the *impulse* for and the *engine* of change. *Obstacles* to change are therefore discussed after both of those have been considered.

Impulse

Common *fears* provide a stronger impulse than shared *visions*, but their relationship is symbiotic. The range of global problems that face the Western world is vast,[35] but to provide an effective impulse for change the danger has to be of a scale and comprehensibility that will evoke public support for precautionary action, even if the event horizon is known to be 10–20 years in the future. Among several candidates, three have a certainty and salience, and span a broad enough range, to argue for their inclusion in this particular discussion, namely: a hegemonic shift; global nuclear devastation; and emergent chaos.[36]

A hegemonic shift The danger stems from the differential growth in world populations. Take Asia as stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the Pacific, and the West as comprising greater Europe and its colonial descendants around the world. Today, Asians outnumber Westerners by at least two and a half times, but the West's economic and military power more than compensates for that disparity. Looking ahead 25–30 years, the numerical disparity may be as much as four to five times, with no compensating advantages, and may well lead to a shift in hegemonic power away from the West. Historically, such shifts have been linked with international turbulence and war.[37]

In global terms, this would be just one of many tribulations affecting the world community, and there would be little it could do about it. For the West, the prospect of such a shift could serve as a powerful impulse to change its ways while there was still time. The logic is clear: (1) coercive instruments of policy favour the strong; (2) politico-legal constraints on those coercive means protect the weak; (3) politico-legal regimes provide the strong with an alternative means of preventing unfavourable developments (such as nuclear proliferation) that is potentially more effective than coercion; (4) at an early stage in such a regime's existence, the strong can use it to impose its terms on the weak (e.g. prohibit nuclear production); (5) for such a regime to constrain the strong from coercing the weak, it has to have been long-established and successfully enforced.[38]

[35] There is value in the vagueness of this term, 'Western world', which embraces those countries which (by default) subscribe to the ANSP and would be involved in engineering a shift to the CGSP. Nor is it accidental that I am referring to the West, rather than the global community.

[36] If others can be identified, more power to our bow.

[37] The only peaceful transfer was from Britain to the United States, which took place during the Second World War, at a time when their relations were governed by a formal alliance, constructed to defeat other challengers. Note, however, that in the 1920s and early 1930s, US naval war plans for the Pacific region assumed that Britain would be the enemy.

[38] 'Regime' is used here to denote a set of political arrangements and legal agreements.

Today, those nations whose people originally came from Europe (the Westerners) are relatively strong. They dominate world culture, enjoy a technological advantage and possess powerful means of coercion. In 20–30 years' time, those nations will constitute a cultural minority and they will have lost their technological advantage. They will be relatively weak. In those circumstances, Westerners would benefit from the existence of a politico-legal regime able to constrain the strong from coercing the weak. To be effective, such a regime would have to be long-established.

At this particular juncture, the Western powers are uniquely placed to establish such a regime, which would be of immediate use in helping to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and limiting conflict. For such a regime to be acceptable, the Western powers would have to moderate their emphasis on military force as an instrument of overseas policy, and rely increasingly on socio-economic and politico-legal means. This would conform to global trends during the last 100 years: except as an instrument of punishment, resort to war has proved increasingly dysfunctional; the cost of projecting coercive force has risen exponentially, while its political utility has steadily declined.

Global nuclear devastation The combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons means that a nuclear exchange is ultimately inevitable. This dictum of Robert McNamara is supported by a significant body of empirical research, which concluded that 'nuclear inadvertence' was inherent in the structure of the opposing strategic forces during the Cold War, and that there was considerable scope for misunderstanding or accident in the NATO command structure on the central front in Europe.[39]

The primary source of danger is not some rogue state or even a premeditated disarming strike by an adversary. The danger lies in accidental or inadvertent war which (by definition) is not amenable to deterrence. Looking to the future, history predicts that US preponderance will engender centres of countervailing power. The present low-salience nuclear world is a transient phenomenon related to the current hiatus in international affairs, and the past 50 years show that a high-salience nuclear world is the norm; low salience is an exception. This is because the nuclear arms race has a dynamic of its own, combining the crude logic of conventional advantage with the sophistries of deterrence theory. Next time round, the arms race will be multi-polar and the probability of accidental and/or inadvertent war will rise exponentially to reach near-certainty.

A growing body of international opinion, including national governments, international commissions, and former senior members of the governments and

[39] There has yet to be any public challenge to the underlying analyses, which were published in 1989–93. For source references see Michael MccGwire, 'The elimination of nuclear weapons', in John Baylis and Robert O'Neill, eds, *Alternative nuclear futures: the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 146–7. For specific reference to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, see Robert S. McNamara, 'Reflections on war in the twenty-first century: the context for nuclear abolition', ibid., pp. 167–82; and Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein, *We all lost the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 19–145.

military of the five recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS), agrees with this diagnosis. It concludes that the only way to escape this certain danger is to embark *now* on the elimination of nuclear weapons, a process that could take 20–30 years.

Emergent chaos[40] This danger stems from the likely combination of two sources, each serious in its own right. One is the potential consequence of recurrent communal (or mass) violence, which usually involves the breakdown of societal cohesion and the displacement of the sense of legitimacy on which rest the rules that regulate routine social interactions as well as government authority.[41] This form of violence, where communal disputes escalate to ethnic massacre, appears to be contagious. Looking to the future, the West faces the possibility that the 'lawlessness' characterizing communal violence, combined with the ready availability of weapons and the pressures of globalization, will undermine the legal foundations on which the international economy and its constituent societies absolutely depend.[42]

The other danger stems from a new class of threat in which dispersed (or distributed) processes 'pose dangers of large magnitude and incalculable probability'. Steinbruner envisages 'the unforeseen interaction of deployed forces, the erosion of legal standards, the evolution of dangerous pathogens (which could be deliberately created or naturally evolved), or the tipping of vital environmental balances', but the concept allows for endless permutations. He points out that the established security posture of 'contingency reaction' is ill-suited to this new class of threat, which can be countered only by 'anticipatory preemption', which in turn would have to be done in 'global coalition'.[43]

Shared vision The idea of some kind of world order goes back a long way; its fruits can be seen in the United Nations and its sister organizations as well as numerous offshoots. For many, the vision is only partly fulfilled, and there is still much to be done in the way of treaties and conventions that 'order' the international system, particularly those related to global and local conflict, peacekeeping and the like. The foreign policy and national security establishments of the major Western powers do not share this vision, while the minor powers are always sensitive to where their immediate interests lie. However, nongovernmental organizations have become increasingly influential, and within all those countries, well-established and articulate institutions, organizations and pressure groups actively promote their preferred variant of the central vision.

[40] This paragraph draws on the analysis and argument in Steinbruner, *Principles of global security*, pp. 134–46 and 197–8.

[41] As an indication of the scale of the problem, Steinbruner gives the following examples of casualties: Mozambique (1981–4) more than 1 million; Sudan (two wars over 40 years) 1.5–2.0 million; Rwanda (1993–4) 0.5–0.8 million.

[42] Steinbruner, *Principles of global security*, p. 139. I have cherry-picked his argument, which is framed in terms of a potential military requirement for preventive intervention.

[43] Steinbruner, *Principles of global security*, p. 196. He first discussed the distinction between a deliberate threat and one that emerges from broadly distributed processes in *The cybernetic theory of decisions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974).

Engine

The danger that underlies the first two impulses for change can be obviated only by negotiations. At the same time, a policy of anticipatory pre-emption will be needed to counter the third and most immediate danger, and this will require an unprecedented level of cooperation, coordination and delegation among nations, which will depend for its success on the negotiating climate. In all three cases, the necessary negotiations will need to be of a different kind from those associated with the ANSP, with its zero-sum approach and talk of 'offensive diplomacy'; and different, also, from negotiations with the non-aligned and third world outside the East–West confrontation, which were largely about preserving Western advantages inherited from a colonial past or new advantages acquired in the wake of the Second World War. Increasingly in the past 30 years, international negotiations have been about preventing states—other than the original five—from acquiring a nuclear capability or other means of mass destruction, while fending off attempts by the global community to prevent the arms race from being extended to outer space.

The engine of change from the ANSP to a CGSP would be provided by the extended process of negotiations needed to circumvent the threats that provide the impulse for change. The core of that process would be negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC). Such a convention reflects the reality that the elimination of nuclear weapons is the only way of obviating the near-certainty of global nuclear devastation; embarking on such a project could be seen as the real end of the Cold War, recreating the opportunity that the Baruch Plan squandered in 1946. The essential first step is for the five original NWS to adopt, unequivocally and without caveats, the 'firm and serious goal' of a nuclear-weapon-free (NWF) world.[44] This would be a strategic decision taken on long-range political–military grounds and would not require a prior shift in the paradigm. Adopting that goal would get negotiations on an NWC under way, a process that could last for 20–30 years and would extend beyond the founding convention to cover the whole elimination process, including verification, compliance and a mass of ancillary agreements.[45]

Unlike present-day negotiations on nuclear matters, where stalemate is the norm, there would be a quite unusual coincidence of interest among the global participants in the treaty-making process. For a start, the most powerful nations

[44] The wording of Article VI of the 1970 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) allows the NWS to claim that their obligation to nuclear disarmament depends on a treaty on general and nuclear disarmament; this is universally seen as unachievable. In May 2001, to avoid breakdown of the NPT review conference, the NWS gave an unequivocal undertaking to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals (but not to nuclear disarmament), their use of the term 'unequivocal' being seen as a major concession—the first in 30 years. Hence my use of Quinlan's qualifier 'firm and serious' in relation to the goal of an NWF world. For background see Rebecca Johnson. 'NPT report', *Disarmament Diplomacy* 46, May 2000, pp. 2–21; Michael MccGwire, 'Is there a future for nuclear weapons?', *International Affairs* 70: 2, April 1994, p. 211.

[45] Clearly, the question of verification and monitoring is central to the whole process. The discipline has made immense strides in the last fifteen years, but it is still low on its learning curve and there is significant scope for further advance, given the necessary investment. The full array of measures does *not* have to be in place before embarking on the lengthy negotiating process.

would be making the greatest concessions, and their unforced decision to join with others in removing this threat to humanity could have far-reaching consequences. Meanwhile, negotiations on an NWC and the elimination of nuclear weapons would bring ancillary benefits. For example, it would defuse dissatisfaction with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly its two-tier structure, and enforcing the NPT would no longer be seen as a dispute between haves and have-nots, which should make it easier to enforce controls on the movement of fissile material; it would facilitate policing the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and monitoring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, for chemical and biological weapons could no longer be justified as the poor man's deterrent; and, most importantly, it would remove the present block on even considering how the world community could prevent an arms race in outer space.

At an early stage in this process, the reflexive effects of this shift in Western attitudes would create a favourable international climate for addressing the other two threats. *Anticipatory pre-emption* implies an increased role for international organizations, the availability of the necessary early warning intelligence, and the provision of 'on call' (if not 'standing') police and military forces, capable of timely response. To establish such an international capability, to institutionalize its funding and to put in place a streamlined decision-making and legitimizing process within the UN or designated regional organizations, would require lengthy and skilful negotiations.

By comparison, it should be relatively easy to meet the precautionary requirement to have in place a body of well-established international law designed to restrain the strong from coercing the weak, in the likely event of a hegemonic shift in the next 20–30 years. This system of laws would be designed to protect Western vital interests in that distant future and assumes a willingness to limit Western freedom of action in the short run for the sake of long-term security. Given the international goodwill created by Western acceptance of the need to pursue the goal of an NWF world, there should be little difficult in negotiating the necessary treaties.

Meanwhile, and most importantly, the progressive shift in Western attitudes from the ANSP to a CGSP would open up a whole raft of global problems to renewed scrutiny and debate, and clear the way for fruitful negotiations leading to international agreement and law.

Obstacles

Persuading the nuclear weapon states to embark on negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention is clearly a major obstacle to getting the process of change under way. Another is US insistence on autonomy in foreign policy, which is something different from the question of unilateralism vs multilateralism. And there are also core Western values and beliefs—often praiseworthy in themselves—which, when taken together, become a significant obstacle to change.

Nuclear weapons Negotiations on an NWC are at the heart of the engine of change; at the present time, an absolute obstacle to such negotiations is American lack of interest. However, that interest has not always been lacking, and will not necessarily be lacking in the future. When the Clinton administration took office in 1993, there were expectations that a radical reorientation of US nuclear strategy would follow. A massive build-down of nuclear forces (initiated by the previous administration) was already under way, and in the years prior to taking office, some of the top foreign policy and defence officials in the Clinton administration had argued for a policy that devalued the role of nuclear weapons in US national security policy.[46]

These nuclear *marginalizers* argued that the end of the Cold War provided the opportunity to set nuclear weapons on the road to ultimate elimination. In practical terms, this meant that 'the US should do everything in its power to marginalise the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy, as part of a broader process of delegitimising the international possession of these weapons'.[47] In the event, *traditionalist* policies largely prevailed (albeit at lower levels of forces and readiness); but this was the result of active institutional resistance and a lack of sustained attention by senior political leaders,[48] rather than the cogency of their case.

Although this particular opportunity for a fundamental reorientation of policy was missed, the debate about nuclear weapons was now on the public agenda and the focus of major studies within the wider US policy community.[49] The argument for elimination was firmly established on the middle ground of the national security debate,[50] rather than confined to the idealistic fringe.[51] Meanwhile, the

[46] For example, in January 1992, writing in his capacity as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Les Aspin (who would shortly become Clinton's first Secretary for Defense) prepared a short paper entitled 'From deterrence to denuking: a new nuclear policy for the 1990s', in which he argued: 'if we now had the opportunity to ban all weapons, we would'. See Stephen A. Cambone and Patrick J. Garrity, 'The future of US nuclear policy', *Survival* 36: 4, Winter 1994–5, pp. 73–95, n. 1. See also McGeorge Bundy, William J. Crowe Jnr and Sidney D. Drell, *Reducing nuclear danger: the road away from the brink* (New York: Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 5. The authors asserted that if the gods offered to take all nuclear weapons off the table of international affairs, such an offer 'would deserve instant acceptance'. Lamenting that no one knew how to abolish them, the authors put on record their authoritative opinion that nuclear weapons diminished, rather than enhanced, US security.

[47] Cambone and Garrity, 'The future of US nuclear policy', p. 75. For a sample of the marginalist perspective, see the publications referred to ibid., n. 4.

[48] See Nolan, *An elusive consensus*, pp. 103–7. Among reasons for the failure of the 1993–4 'Nuclear Posture Review' Nolan includes 'an absent president' and the 'the loss of and failure to replace a powerful and politically astute advocate after Les Aspin's resignation as secretary of defence'.

[49] Two reports published in 1997 were of particular significance because of the parent organizations' status and the calibre, qualifications and experience of the working party members: 'The future of US nuclear weapons policy' by the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the US National Academy of Sciences; and a three-year multi-report project at the Henry L. Stimson Center, chaired by General Andrew J. Goodpaster (USA ret.), former SACEUR. The Union of Concerned Scientists also made important contributions to the ongoing debate.

[50] The Stimson Center report (p. vii) concluded that 'the ultimate objective of US national security policy should be the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction from all states' and that the long-term strategy to achieve that 'must be anchored in the vigorous pursuit of an NWF world'. The National Academy of Science's committee (which favoured the concept of 'prohibition' over 'elimination') considered that 'a path to eventual prohibition could be found' (i.e. it was feasible in practical terms), if some fairly demanding political preconditions could be met (pp. 9–10).

[51] The number of former US senior officers and senior officials who favour elimination is notable. For a brief overview of the ongoing US debate, see Robert A. Manning, 'The ultimate redux: US policy in a

issue had been placed on the international agenda by the Canberra Report, produced by the Commission of that name, which was set up by the Australian government in 1995.[52] Its trenchant recommendations and comprehensive collection of well-informed background papers established the report's authority; the US described it as defining the path ahead to disarmament, while the UN General Assembly suggested it could form the basis of negotiations for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.[53] The report underpinned the initiative by the eight-nation New Agenda Coalition and paved the way for the Tokyo Forum in 1999, which was co-sponsored by the Japanese government.[54] The Forum's report supported Canberra, but stressed that new nuclear dangers had emerged in the intervening years.[55]

The professional calibre of the support for an NWF world must here stand proxy for an exposition of its desirability and feasibility.[56] However, three points need emphasizing:

- *The choice* is not between the present situation and some hypothetical NWF world. The subjects for comparison are *likely outcomes over time* of alternative courses of action: (1) persist with existing policies; (2) adopt the goal of an NWF world. *Neither* course of action is risk-free.
- *Comparative risk*: in a nuclear world, the worst case is a *full-scale nuclear exchange* that would destroy civilization. In an NWF world, 'nuclear breakout' would lead (in the very worst case) to the *limited use* of nuclear weapons.
- *The aim* is to reduce the probability of a major nuclear exchange to zero, while reducing the probability that any nuclear weapon will be used by anyone in any way to as low a figure as possible. The aim is specific, limited and (in technical terms) feasible.

The major strand of the official case for retention is that it is *politically* infeasible to get all the de facto nuclear states to give up their weapons.[57] This is a

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new era', in *Nuclear weapons: a new great debate* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the WEU, 2001), Chaillot Papers no. 48, pp. 58–62.

[52] For a comprehensive analysis of the Canberra 'process' and its aftermath, see Marianne Hanson and Carl Ungerer, 'The Canberra Commission; paths followed, paths ahead', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 53: 1, 1999, pp. 6–17, on which the rest of this paragraph is based.

[53] At a press conference in Washington on 5 December 1996, the report was publicly endorsed by 63 senior military officers from the United States, Russia and elsewhere, led by Generals Lee Butler and Andrew Goodpaster.

[54] The New Agenda Coalition (comprising Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden) submitted a letter dated 9 June 1998 to the UN Secretary General, calling for all NWS to undertake general and compete disarmament (UNGA A/523/138).

[55] The Report of the Tokyo Forum, *Facing nuclear dangers: an action plan for the 21st century* (Tokyo: Japanese Institute of International Affairs, 1999).

[56] There is now a substantial and growing literature on the subject. For the most complete, succinct, and up-to-date exposition, see Robert O'Neill, 'Weapons of the underdog', in Baylis and O'Neill, *Alternative nuclear futures*, pp. 191–208. The book also contains a select bibliography of recent sources. O'Neill was Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982–7, and thereafter Chichele Professor of History at All Souls, University of Oxford.

[57] Walter B. Slocum, 'Prepared statement on "The future of nuclear deterrence"', ibid., pp. 243–4. The other strands are the difficulty of verifying the elimination process over many years and the claim that

chicken-and-egg problem; the official line takes no account of the certain and very substantial reflexive response to an American decision to adopt publicly the 'firm and serious' goal of an NWF world.[58]

In sum, it appears that the nuclear obstacle is less immovable than generally assumed, and that the present situation is a by-product of institutional inertia, unrelated policies and the vagaries of events rather than deliberated decisions.[59] It may require an 'Oops!' event to precipitate movement; meanwhile there is a major task of public education to be done: alerting Western electorates to the inherent dangers of nuclear weapons,[60] and informing them of the results of up-to-date historical analysis of the period 1945–90, a record of events, causes and consequences that is no longer distorted by Cold War blinkers or the rose-tinted spectacles of triumphalism.

US autonomy The issue for America is not the relative merits of unilateralism and multilateralism, but the question of national autonomy in foreign affairs. The overriding priority given to this concept dates back to the eighteenth century, when autonomy was the natural sentiment for a newly constituted nation, most of whose forebears had come to America to escape restrictions at home. The taste for untrammelled autonomy was fed during the nineteenth century by the explosive continental expansion of the original Union through seizure, eviction, purchase, annexation and war with Mexico. When the United States entered on to the world scene as a world power with the Spanish–American war of 1899, it already enjoyed a degree of effective national autonomy unequalled by any of the European states, which had to contend with one another.

This ingrained habit was reinforced by the sense of exceptionalism felt by the majority of Americans, and with some justification. Besides their advantages—shared by most migrant communities—of being self-selected in terms of enterprise, determination and a libertarian attitude to authority, the land they had settled had a unique combination of attributes. It lay in the temperate band of 30–50 degrees; it was the nearest destination for the 'huddled masses' of Europe; and,

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nuclear weapons are needed to avert major war. For a summary review of why the other nuclear states would fall into line if the United States adopted the goal of a NWF world, see Michael MccGwire, 'The possibility of a non-nuclear world', in *Brassey's Defence Year Book, 1995* (London: Brassey's/Centre for Defence Studies, 1995) p. 357.

[58] In the same vein, official insistence that any move towards nuclear disarmament can be made only if it is part of a wider move towards regional and global security ignores the reflexive effect and the larger vision of the paradigm shift.

[59] Would the 1993–4 Nuclear Posture Review have turned out differently if Defense Secretary Les Aspin had not been taken ill? Would it have made a difference if the Australian Labor Party had won the 1996 election and the Canberra Report had been adopted formally as a General Assembly Resolution in September that year?

[60] The third paragraph of the introductory 'Statement' of the Canberra Report (August 1996) asserts that 'There is no doubt that if the peoples of the world were more fully aware of the inherent danger of nuclear weapons and the consequences of their use, they would reject them, and not permit their continued possession or acquisition on their behalf by their governments, even for an alleged need for self-defence.' Are we to assume that Western leaders, elected on a narrow mandate of providing for economic and social well-being, are qualified to refute the Canberra Commission's carefully considered assessment of 'the common sense of the people'?

as a result of the intra-European wars of the nineteenth century, there was a well-endowed empire-for-the-taking in its backyard. This would extend the US domain to the Pacific coast and ensure a preponderance of power in the hemisphere.

The high value placed on American autonomy is legitimized by constitutional provisions that effectively prohibit the US government from entering into any international agreement that assigns to a non-US body the authority to make binding decisions or laws. Only a government that is directly accountable to the US people can make such laws, which is one reason why US acceptance of such agreements has always been conditional. These conditions have invariably included the preservation of the Monroe Doctrine; self-determination of the fulfilment of obligations; the right to rescind a treaty and the right to exercise (either explicitly or by the way the treaty is structured) effective veto power over any combination of co-signatories.[61]

Given the clear priority accorded to autonomy, how is it that the United States is a founder member of a continuum of multilateral 'security' organizations around the world? In every case, US autonomy was preserved by ensuring that the organization's stated purpose was congruent with US global interests and that in no circumstances could other members take collective action against America's wishes. The disparity in effective power and the availability of inducements ensured that members would hesitate to take serious issue with US leadership.

At one end of the continuum, the founding treaty of the Organization of American States (1948) secured the Western hemisphere. It registered that Washington had renounced a right to intervene unilaterally in the region, while providing for a new right of intervention in the collective interest. This collective right was used eight times between 1954 and 1994, to justify what were essentially unilateral interventions in the region.

At the other end of the continuum stands NATO (1949). Seen by the Europeans as a way of keeping 'the Germans down, the Russians out, and the Americans in', for the United States it was also a way of enlisting the economic potential and military manpower of Western Germany to the cause of containing (and perhaps fighting) the Soviet Union and rolling back communism. However, while providing the framework for what would become a powerful military machine under the supreme command of an American, the treaty's commitment to action was carefully circumscribed. While agreeing that an attack on one was an attack on all, each party to the treaty was committed only to 'take such action as it deems necessary'; that is, the US response would be decided by Congress, not by the NATO Council. US autonomy was preserved.

The circumstances prevailing in the early 1950s and the vital importance of US military involvement ensured that the other members of NATO deferred to US

[61] Michael Dunne, 'US foreign relations in the twentieth century: from world power to global hegemony', *International Affairs* 76: 1, January 2000, p. 34. This section draws on Dunne's illuminating article and on the essays by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jnr, John R. Bolton and Jeremy Rabkin in Gwyn Prins, ed., *Understanding unilateralism in American foreign relations* (London: RIIA, 2000).

leadership. Alliance management was made easier by the bilateral agreements between individual members (some of which pre-dated by several years their joining NATO), which gave the United States direct access to members' governments when engineering a NATO 'consensus'. In later years, discontent was alleviated by organizational adjustments such as creating a policy/planning group of major powers.

In the 1990s US autonomy within NATO increased as west European governments failed to agree on how best to provide for the security of Europe, while the White House (with congressional support but against the advice of the State Department and Defense Department) pressed ahead with NATO enlargement, deciding on who should join and when. In an attempt to reassure Russia, NATO signed the Founding Act in 1997, establishing a Permanent Joint Council for consultation and joint decisions in appropriate areas. In 1998 a Senate resolution prohibited any such joint decision-making. Autonomy had been restored.

Preserving autonomy within the United Nations was to prove more difficult. However, of the 50 nations attending the charter-drafting conference, 20 Latin Americans plus Liberia and the Philippines ensured the one-third vote needed to veto undesirable motions. Combined with the Europeans and British Commonwealth, this also yielded the majority needed for positive action, such as insisting on Article 51, which implicitly recognized the Monroe Doctrine by effectively excluding the Rio Treaty from the purview of the Security Council. These arrangements worked well enough for 10–15 years, after which the United States became increasingly disenchanted, as the flood of new members meant the UN was no longer a biddable instrument of US policy. There was a brief *rapprochement* at the time of the Gulf War (when the United States enjoyed effective autonomy), but its experience in Somalia and Bosnia reinforced America's distrust of the organization and multilateral intervention under its auspices.

In the Kosovo crisis of 1999, the United States sought to rely solely on NATO, and the Rambouillet plans for deploying an 'implementation force' were written so as to deny the UN any role in the process. The United States provided over 80 per cent of the air effort; but despite being under the command of SACEUR and US generals, the operation did not work out as hoped, and the UN became involved in both the final settlement and the implementation process. More disturbing to the United States, in this low-intensity but highly political conflict, was that US autonomy was eroded; while it paid the piper it did not pick all the tunes, the finale in particular.

The conflict in Afghanistan of autumn 2001, where interests, honour and retribution are involved, has shown that the lessons of Kosovo were well learned. The UN and NATO have both been used to provide political and legal cover, but are excluded from political and military decision-making; with Russia on board and China compliant, the UN is once more a biddable instrument. The United States knows what it wants and takes what it needs from the

coalition of the willing; and it leaves the rest, avoiding the discomfort of an alliance, where each has a voice and all can gang up on the leader.

The ANSP fits US autonomy like a glove. It has worked well in the case of Afghanistan, which was already at war with itself. It was easy to demonize one faction and enlist another as foot soldiers, while pursuing the separate goal of uprooting al-Q'aida's base structure and capturing or killing its leader. However, this approach will not work against the emergent threats described earlier in this article; and we have yet to see how well it has worked in terms of Afghanistan's larger future.

Meanwhile, the emphasis on autonomy will remain at the core of US foreign policy until it is gradually eroded by the process of moving from the ANSP to a CGSP, which will foster a condition of 'institutionalized collaboration' as the major states are drawn into a 'network of cooperation and consultation'.

Core values and beliefs

Realism This has an essential role when evaluating events and identifying policy options, and is a background condition to Western policy-making. However, the realist approach is not without flaws, and for the most part these put grit in the engine of change.[62] A deterministic view of world affairs means that realism belittles the possibility of engendering change, or structuring the future. It has short time-horizons and downplays the future danger of rival power centres, renewed nuclear arms racing, and the possibility of inadvertent war. It disparages setting objectives, unless the means for achieving them are already in place. Following Morgenthau's dictum, realism privileges the short-term utility of power at the expense of cooperation, and gives insufficient weight to the role of reflexivity in international relations.

Democracy Churchill made the point that democracy has serious flaws, albeit fewer than all other systems of government. In the first-past-the-post voting system these flaws become important when foreign policy and national security issues are involved, because the democratic process provides an opportunity for key issues of national policy to fall victim to domestic politics. During the Cold War, US partisan politics fuelled the arms race and handicapped the arms control process.[63] The adage of 'wrapping oneself in the flag' held good; invariably the pressure was for more assertive policies and against compromise, and thus conducive to distrust of cooperation.

Electoral politics ensures that issues of international politics are grossly oversimplified and political slogans take over the role of carefully thought-out

[62] I speak here of man-in-the-street realism and not the theoretical variant.

[63] See McCGwire, 'The paradigm that lost its way', pp. 791–3. It is of interest that Gorbachev would have been unable to reformulate Soviet military doctrine and make the concessions involving asymmetrical reductions that led to the end of the Cold War if there had been a congressional system of government in Moscow.

policy objectives.[64] In the main, foreign news does not attract large audiences, and commercial pressures on the media mean that democratic electorates are not well informed about what takes place outside their own country. In any case, democratic concern stops at the frontier. George W. Bush made the point that he had been elected to protect and promote the interests of the American people, not to save the planet. This discontinuity between national, international and worldwide democracy is something the 'democratic West' shows little inclination to address.[65]

Triumphalism and market economics Earlier in this article, it was noted that the victors in a war rarely question the paradigm that seemingly brought them success: 'We won, they lost; we were right, they were wrong.' The Soviet Union certainly lost, and in very many ways it was wrong; but it does not necessarily follow that the West was right. The cost to the world community of the Cold War provides another reason for reopening the history of the 50 years from 1940 to 1990, so that soundly based lessons can be drawn for the future—lessons that will almost certainly support the case for a paradigm shift.

A final obstacle to change is the basket of values that the West seems to have taken on board since the end of the Second World War. Western society is now undergirded by four concepts: possessive individualism; consumer democracy; global capitalism; and unconstrained science and technology. The first two drive the third, which is fuelled by the fourth. One of the salient characteristics of capitalism is the gross inequalities produced by market economies, national or global. Given the reluctance of the rich in Western countries to share (through the medium of taxation) part of their disproportionate gains with their less fortunate compatriots, there seems little hope that the wealthy West will be inclined to divert the funds that are needed for world development.

Precipitator

An NWC would be an important 'good' in its own right, but the extended process of negotiating such a treaty is also intended to serve as the engine of change in shifting from the ANSP to a CGSP. Such negotiations would depend absolutely on the active and willing participation of the United States. How is that to be achieved?

In 1992–4, as noted above, there was serious debate within the US national security community about the continuing utility and future role of nuclear

[64] George Kennan coined the term 'containment', which served as the main objective of US foreign and security policy throughout the Cold War. The slogan 'enlargement and engagement' (of democratic market economies) was chosen to replace it by the Clinton administration, but it did not 'take', except in the military context of NATO enlargement. The George W. Bush administration seems to have fastened on 'war against terrorism' for the time being.

[65] Academic talk of 'cosmopolitan democracy' seems to be just another slogan. We appear to be no closer to understanding how to bridge that gap than we are to knowing how to bridge the conceptual gap between micro- and macroeconomics. See, for example, David Held et al., *Global transformations: politics, economics and culture* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

weapons. In the absence of effective political leadership by the Clinton administration the established view prevailed; but the debate was carried forward by seriously professional organizations and institutions; they concluded that the elimination of nuclear weapons was very much in both American and international interests, although they differed on how this goal might be reached. Energized by the Canberra Report and its favourable reception, the campaign for an NWC (which would be comparable to the existing conventions on chemical and biological weapons) was gathering way,[66] both at grassroots level in America and in the world at large: Abolition 2000 had over 2,000 member *organizations* by the year 2000.[67] Meanwhile, pressure from non-nuclear states for movement by the NWS was mounting; the NPT review conference in May 2000 was saved from collapse only by last-minute textual adjustments, conceded after decades of stonewalling by the NWS.

In sum, the situation is very different from that which prevailed during the Cold War, when it was considered naïve, if not treasonable, to challenge the utility (and the morality) of policies founded on nuclear deterrence. It was, however, in those circumstances that a single individual was able to launch the 'Freeze Movement', a grassroots campaign that swept the United States like prairie fire.[68] At the time it was said that the Strategic Defense Initiative (an idea that had been around for several years) was announced in order to counter the embarrassing success of the Freeze campaign. True or not, it illustrates the importance of grassroots movements, one of the glories of American democracy.

On a different but relevant point, US insistence on deploying a national missile defence (NMD) system has no bearing on the case for an NWC.[69] From the US point of view, the matter of NMD is a done deal and the focus now is on how to arrange things with allies and with the other declared NWS. Meanwhile, the growing availability of conventional weapons capable of destroying hardened targets deep below ground should reverse the trend in US security discourse of 'normalizing' the use of small nuclear warheads as a means of removing the threat of chemical and biological weapons to Western military intervention.

Given this situation, what could Britain do to persuade America to embark on the lengthy process of negotiating an NWC? For a start, we must recognize that the 'special relationship' applies mainly at the staff level, where it is very

[66] Tom Milne has drawn my attention to the comprehensive Model Nuclear Weapons Convention drafted by an international consortium of lawyers, scientists, disarmament experts, physicians and other activists, and released by the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) in April 1997. See <http//lcnp.org/mnwc>.

[67] Abolition 2000, established in 1995 to promote an NWC, has become one of the world's largest international networks.

[68] The 'Freeze Movement' was organized by Randy Fosberg, a peace activist based in Boston, as her response to the sharp rise in international tension resulting from the Reagan administration's confrontational policies, the furore over the deployment of 'clean' battlefield nuclear weapons, and preparations for the deployment of Euro-missiles.

[69] They involve radically different timescales and are not interdependent. At some future date, it is conceivable that the United States will seek to use nuclear warheads on its interceptors, because of technical inadequacies in the proposed conventional system. That is not an issue at present, and an NWC would in due course eliminate the need for NMD.

close and reaches high up the hierarchies; by contrast, when it comes to strategic policy decisions at the political level, particularly when congressional politics is involved, Britain probably gets less consideration than certain of the other major powers, and outcomes depend strongly on what US interests are involved.[70] It is clear from congressional hearings that automatic British acquiescence is taken for granted, even to the extent of discourtesy. For example, within a year of reluctant British support being given for a US volte-face at LOS III,[71] and without consulting London,[72] US troops had landed on Grenada and set up a government acceptable to Washington.[73]

US decisions on nuclear matters are (and always have been) at least as much a matter of domestic politics as of national security policy, and the best way of influencing decisions in this area is via the electoral grass roots; this has the added attraction of bypassing institutional interests in the Pentagon and elsewhere. Currently, public interest in matters nuclear is quiescent, but the United States is well provided with anti-nuclear activists, including high-profile associations of scientists, lawyers, doctors and other professionals. These provide the crucial embers ignited in periodic flare-ups of public concern, such as occurred at the end of the 1950s and again in 1982–3, and as would occur in the case of some future nuclear mishap.

Historical circumstances mean that Britain is peculiarly well placed to re-ignite the embers of nuclear concern in the United States. The country is well regarded by most Americans, especially following its immediate and wholehearted support for US action in the wake of 11 September. It is in good standing with US government arms controllers, who see Britain as a constructive influence. As one of the original three nuclear powers, it participated in the early negotiations limiting the testing, deployment and proliferation of nuclear weapons; it made (and continues to make) important contributions in the field of verification;[74] and it made significant contributions to the two main conventions underlying the chemical and biological weapons regime. As one of the five NWS, it has stood shoulder to shoulder with Washington in rebuffing all attempts by non-

[70] At the prime minister/president level, given the right chemistry, it may be possible for Britain to exercise a restraining influence on policies that effect it directly. It was, however, noticeable that Washington paid no heed to British objections to its proposals for NATO enlargement.

[71] After 15 years of negotiations, with numerous concessions to keep the United States aboard, the newly installed Reagan administration repudiated the work of its four predecessors. This was officially because of dissatisfaction over managing deep sea minerals, but really because of traditional concerns over constraints on US freedom of action (autonomy). Only three major powers refused to sign: Britain and West Germany (under US pressure), and the United States.

[72] It is known that Washington deliberately kept London in the dark.

[73] In the case of the Falklands War, when US Sidewinders and satellite imagery were so important, Britain was lucky that anglophile Caspar Weinberger was Secretary of Defense and that Secretary of State Alexander Haig (formerly SACEUR) came down on Weinberger's side in the latter's dispute with Jeanne Kirkpatrick (US Ambassador to the UN), who favoured Argentina.

[74] Tom Milne and Henrietta Wilson, *Verifying nuclear disarmament: a role for AWE Aldermaston* (London: British Pugwash Group, 1999). The Atomic Weapons Establishment achieved significant advances in forensic seismology, which have been important in correcting alarmist interpretations of seismic disturbances as secret Russian testing.

nuclear states (including friends and allies) to persuade the 'five' to consider seriously the possibility of an NWC.

If Britain were to announce that it had decided to reverse its policy on nuclear weapons, the anti-nuclear movement in America (and around the world) would come alight. The justification for the decision would be twofold. The first plank of the argument would rest on the specific grounds that nuclear weapons have no practical use other than deterring nuclear attack; that as long as such weapons exist, human fallibility means that their use, deliberate or inadvertent, is virtually inevitable; and that the reality of international rivalry and the dynamics of arms racing ensure that the results of such use would be catastrophic. The second would rest on the broader grounds discussed in this article. If the major powers are to address effectively global problems such as poverty, underdevelopment, environmental degradation, communal conflict, starvation and the rest, there will need to be a shift in Western attitudes away from the ANSP towards a CGSP. Breaking the long-standing impasse at the UN Conference on Disarmament would be an important first step in that direction,[75] as would acting to implement the spirit of Article VI of the NPT.[76]

A role for Britain?

The unilateral adoption by Britain of the firm and serious goal of an NWF world would be something quite different from proposals for unilateral nuclear disarmament during the Cold War, which were dismissed as 'an empty moral gesture'. Nuclear weapons were at the very centre of the US–Soviet relationship, Americans referred to Britain's nuclear capability as 'a fifth wheel', and what Britain did in this area was largely irrelevant. The situation today is quite different, and Britain is in a position to initiate a virtuous spiral.

In practical terms, the sacrifices are small. We would still have the knowledge, experience and status of being one of the original NWS. We would lose whatever political clout comes from being a 'declared' nuclear power;[77] but that status, which is in any case being steadily devalued, would be replaced and overtaken by a new kind of political clout as a leading member (if not the leader) of the growing number of states actively advocating the elimination of nuclear weapons. As to permanent membership of the Security Council (P_5), there are more likely reasons for losing that role than a change in nuclear status.

[75] The possibility of a joint initiative with France is attractive, but pending a response to grassroots pressure in Washington, it seems likely that the French would wish to retain their nuclear capability 'on behalf of Europe' until the outcome is clear. It is not, however, widely recognized that, as a result of their 1994–6 defence review, the French 'cut their weapons substantially, closed the test bases in the Pacific, and shut fissile material production facilities and warhead design facilities in France . . . measures which the other nuclear powers are a long way from matching'. Communication from Shaun Gregory, author of *French defence policy into the 21st century* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).

[76] See note 44.

[77] For comments on the nuclear status of Britain and France, see O'Neill, 'Weapons of the underdog', pp. 193, 199. In 'status-seeking' terms, he ranks them with India.

It is hard to see what difference such a move would make to Britain's effective military capability.[78] There is talk of nuclear deterrence and sub-strategic targets; but it is all in generalities, and a convincing case has yet to be made about whom we might be seeking to deter from doing what, and what (not whom) we envisage as targets that cannot be dealt with by other means. If the Ministry of Defence is thinking of some future Russian threat, cooperative political initiatives will be cheaper and much more effective. In terms of timing, progress on the road to an NWC could well mesh with decisions on the future of Trident.

In other words, the downside of adopting the goal of an NWF world is small, but the possible gains are immense. It is one of the oddities of postwar international politics that Britain has been a senior member of all the world's best clubs (P5, the NWS, OECD, G8, NATO, EU and Commonwealth) but has 'still to find a role'.[79] Here is one for the taking: acting as the initiator, organizer and energizer of a process that would shift Western attitudes from the adversarial national security paradigm to a cooperative global security paradigm.[80] This role fits well with the vision of an international community that was adumbrated by the Prime Minister in his speeches to the Labour Party Conference and at the Guildhall.

History waiting to be written

Underlying this article is an argument against fatalism and complacency: fatalism that the world is deterministic and there is nothing we can really do about it; complacency that as we 'got by' in the past, we will be able to do so in future.

The world is not deterministic

Back in 1980, who would have forecast that South Africa would move from white domination to black rule without a bloodbath? Who would have forecast that Moscow would withdraw its forces from eastern Europe, redeploy its nuclear assets on Russian soil and dismantle the Soviet Union, all within a two-year period and without major conflict? These outcomes were not predetermined, and a large measure of the credit must go to key individuals such as F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela in South Africa, and Mikhail Gorbachev, George Bush Snr and Helmut Kohl in the case of the Soviet Union.

On the other side of the account, who would have foreseen the genocide in Rwanda and the disintegration of Yugoslavia leading to internecine war? Again, these outcomes were not predetermined. In the case of Rwanda the blame can

[78] I discussed the military utility of nuclear weapons in MccGwire, 'Is there a future for nuclear weapons?', pp. 211–28.

[79] The world at large tended to the opinion that Britain had chosen the role of America's spear-carrier.

[80] In respect to the NWC, Britain could fill the vital role played by Canada at LOS III. Without the full-time involvement of Canada's highly qualified and internationally respected delegation, the LOS III negotiations would never have gained the momentum that ensured their ultimate success. See note 34 above.

be ascribed to the Security Council, which chose to withdraw the UN mission (including a force of 1,600 infantrymen) rather than reinforce it with another 1,000 men.[81] In the case of Yugoslavia, its pivotal role having lapsed with the end of the Cold War, NATO governments withdrew political support from the central government and failed to respond to the fact that austerity measures imposed by the IMF were destabilizing the fragile federal structure.[82] These disastrous outcomes were the result of constructive neglect by Western-dominated decision-making bodies.[83] The 'duty of care' is a concept that applies to most aspects of Western society, but does not extend to international society.

The future is unforgiving

Complacency is misplaced. Surveying the last century and the myriad millions who died from war, starvation, pestilence and neglect, the idea that the world 'got by' is tragic; and for the future, trends in population, climate change, resource depletion and communal violence are all adverse. Fifteen years ago, having concluded that the key issue was whether humankind would survive or perish, Gorbachev argued that it was essential to break with the past and cast aside the traditional approach to foreign policy. Most important was a sense of responsibility for the future of humankind; this bore especially on the superpowers, but had to be shared by all the major powers, particularly the other nuclear states.[84]

As Gorbachev said, it would take moral courage to break with traditional theory about peace and war and adopt a new way of thinking about international relations that smacked of utopianism. Is it possible that Britain's leaders have that courage? In the wake of 11 September, will they dare to approach international relations through the frame of a cooperative global security paradigm?

After 11 September

Is the foregoing now irrelevant? Is the central problem no longer relations between states but the threat to the West from non-state actors? The short answer is 'no'. Terrorism was declared a threat to US national security in the early 1980s and has increasingly been recognized as a background condition. The trial

[81] Steinbruner, *Principles of global security*, pp. 137, 147. The only country with the rapid reinforcement capability was the United States, but Washington declined to commit any forces.

[82] Ibid., pp. 155–7. To encourage Yugoslavia to build up its forces, Western governments provided extensive financial credits but no access to markets. Having lost its economic niche in the Cold War economy, Belgrade was having difficulty in servicing these credits.

[83] Rwanda (1994) preceded Srebrenica (1995). In 1993 the Security Council established six 'safe areas' in Bosnia, and the Secretary General asked for 70,000 troops under NATO control to prevent attacks launched from inside these areas and to deter attacks from the outside. This was turned down by the Security Council. In July 1995, Srebrenica's only protection was a few hundred UN peacekeepers, who were taken hostage by the Serbs. The latter slaughtered some 5,000 Bosnian Muslims considered to be of military age.

[84] See note 31 above.

of those who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993, and the Tomahawk strikes following the attacks on the US embassies in Africa in 1998, indicate that the US and its allies were well aware of the al-Qaida network. The international reaction to 11 September means the world is now much better prepared to respond to and pre-empt this threat.

The more interesting question is whether 11 September could prove to be a precipitating event in terms of shifting the paradigm from the ANSP to a CGSP. Understandably, the early signs were not encouraging, the immediate US response being a compressed version of the pattern established in the first decade of the Cold War. The attack was described in terms of an assault on freedom, democracy, civilization (cf. the Truman Declaration); those who were not with us were against us (Foster Dulles); and anyone who sought the underlying motivation was guilty of 'moral equivalence' (the Reagan version of 'soft on communism'). A 'war on terrorism' was declared—a slogan (like 'containment'), not a carefully worded objective; and the Taliban were declared 'enemy', characterized as fanatics (like the Soviet leaders in the Kremlin),[85] and served ultimata on the grounds they were not amenable to negotiation but understood the language of force (ditto).[86] Given the American sense of outrage, a resort to massive force was politically inevitable, and was designed as much to deliver retribution and a warning to others as to destroy al-Qaida's infrastructure and bring bin Laden to justice.

The longer-term implications are more hopeful. The outburst of official cross-frontier collaboration in developing international means of responding to this newly urgent threat is likely to endure, while the requirements for political and logistic support for US operations against Afghanistan have realigned interests and developed new channels of international cooperation. New personal links have been established at head-of-state level, notably between Britain and Russia, which may allow the latter to be brought properly into the Euro-Atlantic fold. And, most importantly, there is an increased sensitivity to the massive imbalances in world society, to the responsibilities of the Western world in this respect, and to the potential for effecting change through cooperation and collaborative action. Given the appropriate leadership, the tragedies of 11 September may yet result in a vital shift in Western attitudes.

> After all, what is Utopia? It is just history, waiting to be written.[87]

[85] For George Kennan's assessment of the Soviet leadership, see MccGwire, 'The paradigm that lost its way', p. 382.

[86] The available record is unclear. It is known that the United States was pressing the Taliban to evict al-Qaida long before 11 September, and that the leadership refused. It is not clear whether *after* the terrorist attacks there were new attempts to *negotiate* bin Laden's eviction using well-connected high-level Pakistani intermediaries and a full array of carrots and sticks. There were, however, categorical statements by US leaders and the British Prime Minister that the Taliban 'would not negotiate'. Hence the ultimata.

[87] Aleksandr Bovin, 'New thinking: the requirement of the nuclear age', *Kommunist* 10 (July 1986).